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CUSTOMERS, COERCION AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT:
REGULATING SECONDARY CONSUMER BOYCOTTS
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
LARRY S. BUSH*
INTRODUCTION

No subject in American labor law has been more controversial than the secondary boycott.' As a labor stratagem it has taken two very different forms-inducing
secondary employee work stoppages and encouraging the buying public to withhold
patronage. The latter, the consumer boycott, has assumed considerable significance
to organized labor in the past four decades. In large part, its importance stems
from the fact that it is the only form of true secondary pressure remaining in labor's
arsenal of economic weapons.2 Moreover, the consumer boycott can be a more
effective form of economic pressure than primary strikes or picketing, at least if
the primary employer is relatively immune to direct action because of a weak union
presence or the availability of a large supply of replacement workers 3(or automation), but is ultimately dependent upon sales to the general public.
Over twenty-five years ago Congress first undertook to specifically regulate
labor's use of consumer boycotts.4 Limitations were imposed in the Landrum-Griffin
Act 5 at that time because of the strong federal policy of shielding employers from
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. BA., 1968, J.D. 1974, University of
Florida; LL.B., 1979, Cambridge University. The research for this article was supported in part by
a grant from the Lamar Order of the University of Mississippi. The author is indebted to Richard
B. Hankins, second-year law student, for his assistance in preparing this article. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
I Felix Frankfurter defined the secondary boycott in classically simple terms as "a combination
to influence A by exerting some sort of economic or social pressure against persons who deal with
A." F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930). The secondary boycott is not
unique to labor conflicts. Such devices are also used to further the causes of a wide variety of nonlabor
interest groups. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982) (boycott seeking
racial equality and integration of local government and businesses); Missouri v. NOW, Inc., 620 F.2d
1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (boycott of convention sites because state legislature
had not passed the Equal Rights Amendment).
2 See infra text in Parts II and III. Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO, commenting several
years ago on the present legal restrictions on secondary activity, lamented, "All you can do is run
a consumer boycott campaign-'Do not buy,' 'Do not patronize.' You can't say, 'Don't work on it.' "
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1981, at B 12 col. 5.
1 In order to take advantage of this vulnerability at a national level, the AFL-CIO maintains an
"unfair list" of companies and their products. Offending employers are regularly added to the list
and boycotts of their products are authorized, usually as a result of the employer's refusal to recognize
or bargain with a member union. For example, a national boycott of Proctor & Gamble Company
soap products was endorsed in 1981 because the company had refused to reach agreement on a collective bargaining agreement with the United Steelworkers. See 1981 Labor Relations Yearbook 212 (1982).
While such boycotts are usually directed solely against the offending primary employer's product, to
the extent they are successful they necessarily bring adverse economic consequences to secondary employers,
the retailers.
See infra text in Part III.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959).
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economic coercion in connection with labor disputes not of their making. Congress
offset this protection of the "neutral" employer, however, with a poorly-defined
right of organized labor to inform consumers of the primary dispute, and enlist
their aid at the site of this secondary employer's business.6 Today the parameters
of legitimate labor appeals to the public are still far from clear, but recent Supreme
Court decisions7 reflect increasing judicial solicitude toward the plight of affected
businesses and correspondingly less concern for labor's ability to mobilize active
public support.
This Article examines the course of federal regulation of consumer boycotts
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)8 and the balance between the rights
of secondary lusinesses and those of organized labor. Part I briefly sets out the
historical prelude to the Taft-Hartley Act amendments, Congress' first explicit effort
to control secondary activity. Part II focuses on these amendments, which concerned only work stoppages, and on their expanded interpretation by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to reach consumer boycotts. The ambiguous compromise over consumer boycotts subsequently reached by Congress in the LandrumGriffin Act amendments is the subject of Part III. The landmark 1964 Supreme
Court decisions, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers& Warehousemen, Local 760
(Tree Fruits)9 and NLRB v. Servette, Inc.," which served to loosen the new statutory
restrictions on consumer boycotts, are the subject of Part IV. In addition, Part
IV discusses the grudging reception accorded Tree Fruits by the NLRB and federal
courts of appeal, culminating in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local
1001 (Safeco),"1 a virtual rejection of Tree Fruits' grant to labor of the right to
engage in "product picketing." Part V focuses on the NLRB's recent attempt to2
extend the protection of the "publicity proviso" in subsection 8(b)(4) of the NLRA,'
to cover boycotts of any secondary business which could be found to benefit from
the activities of the primary employer, and on the Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. NLRB 13 decision, which has effectively stymied this movement.
6 This right is contained primarily in what has become known as the "publicity proviso" to the
secondary boycott section of the National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
1 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983) (held that handbilling all stores
in a shopping mall was not protected by the "publicity proviso" where dispute was with construction
company building only one store therein); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),
447 U.S. 607 (1980) (held that secondary picketing of title companies who derived over 90% of their

sales from the primary employer's product violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) despite the fact that normal "product
picketing" measures were taken).

' As used in this article, the term "National Labor Relations Act" refers to the original 1935
Act (the Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(the Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, and The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (the Landrum-Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 519. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). References to one of
the three major enactments will, for the most part, use its commonly-accepted title.
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
377 U.S. 46 (1964).
447 U.S. 607 (1980).
12 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
" 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
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It is the author's contention that the method of regulating consumer boycotts
which has evolved since 1959 has been unduly influenced by outmoded attitudes
and a priori assumptions concerning the likely effects of peaceful public appeals
on both shoppers and neutral businesses. Rather than requiring the NLRB and
the courts to determine the legitimate scope of secondary consumer activity by
reference to nebulous tests centered on the extent of economic injury to the secondary
employer and on the proximity of its relationship to the primary employer, an equally
fair and far more predictable system could be established by relying solely on the
well-articluated standard of truthfulness contained in the publicity proviso. Such
a laissez-faire approach should promote a more rational adjustment of the competing
economic interests, with the success of boycotts determined by the persuasiveness
of appeals in the marketplace, not by conceptually troublesome line-drawing on
the part of either the NLRB, the courts, or Congress.
I.

SECONDARY CONSUMER

BOYCOTTS PRIOR TO THE

TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

Consumer boycotts have a long history in this country. Every student learns
something of the active efforts by the Sons and Daughters of Liberty to encourage
the public to reject British goods after the passage of the Stamp Act of March
1765. The first documented boycotts generated by labor disputes followed by less
than sixty years, when the journeyman hatters of Baltimore and the New York
printers called on other workers and the general public to cease dealings with
employers who reduced wages or rejected union working conditions.14
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, organized labor had begun
making such effective use of this tactic that beleaguered companies increasingly
turned to the courts for injunctive relief. They were not disappointed. In a famous
consumer boycott of the Bucks Stove & Range Company, organized by the American
Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers and other labor leaders were enjoined from
continuing the boycott or publishing the company's name on a "we don't patronize"
list. Their refusal resulted in contempt charges, which reached the Supreme Court
in 1911. " Although reversing the lower courts on other grounds, the court clearly
approved of the existing body of state case law treating such conduct as an unlawful
conspiracy subject to injunction:
In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act in concert when
the signal is published, gives the words "Unfair," "We Don't Patronize," or similar
expressions, a force not inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding
any possible right of speech which a single individual might have. Under such circumstances they become what have been called "verbal acts," and as much subject
to injunction as the use of any other force whereby property is unlawfully damaged.

,4 H. LAIDLER, BoycoTTs AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE 70-71 (1913).
" Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 420-23 (1911).
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When the facts in such cases warrant it, a court having jurisdiction of the parties
and subject-matter has power to grant an injunction."
Judicial hostility to labor-inspired consumer boycotts during this time, though
not universal,' 7 was certainly the norm. For instance, in Seattle Brewing & Matting
8
Co. v. Hansen,"
the union was enjoined from circulating notices calling the attention
of labor union members and the general public to the fact that certain saloon keepers
sold the plaintiff's "unfair" product. As in Gompers, the court was primarily concerned with the "signalling" effect such publicity would have on union members,
who presumably would treat the notices as a command from their labor organization
to shun the product, rather than as an appeal to their reason. 9
During the next several decades, however, the political and judicial climate
changed in some jurisdictions. The courts of New York were particularly receptive
to the argument that it should be lawful to picket retailers with signs requesting
the public to refrain only from buying "unfair" goods of the primary manufacturer,
as opposed to seeking a total boycott of the secondary's business.2 In Goldfinger
16Id. at 439. See also Loewe v. Lawlor (the Danbury Hatterscase), 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (enjoined
a union boycott as an unlawful restraint of interstate commerce under antitrust laws).
" See, e.g., Justice Holmes' celebrated dissents in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 498, 57 N.E.
1011, 1015 (1900) and Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896). He argued that
the activities of labor unions, including boycotts, in support of their economic interests were sufficiently
justified, absent "violence, breach of contract, or other conduct unlawful on grounds independent of
the mere fact that the action of the defendants was combined" to survive judicial scrutiny, notwithstanding
their undeniably adverse impact on both primary and secondary employers. 57 N.E. at 1016.
144 F. 1011 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905).
" The mere use of the word "unfair"
has a very distinct meaning in these days; and when
a notice like this is put out it is almost in the nature of a command. Of course, it does
not say to the laboring people, "You shall not drink" such beer, but it says: "To Organized
Labor and Friends: Don't use this beer!" These organizations, in the way they are trained,
for they are as well trained as any military force, understand these rules and know what
they mean. The very use of that term "unfair" has a distinct meaning to them, and it is
in the nature of a direction to the members of these organizations not to use that beer, and
it is also an intimidation to those who are dealing in it. It gives them to understand that
that beer will be boycotted; that it is unfair and will be boycotted. That would deter parties
from using it or dealing in it. There are a number of that kind. Here is another one: "Guard
Your Health by Refusing to Drink Unfair Beer!" Then it proceeds to name the beer that
is unfair, and it includes among others the beer of the complainant. All those things are
what would be termed now under the law "a boycott." I need not go into the definition
of that. We generally understand what it means. But those things tend to unfairly obstruct
the business of the complainant, and in that far these defendants are wrong, and it is the
duty of the court to restrain them from doing anything that will interfere with the complainant's
business.
Id. at 1014. Compare Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919), enjoining
the use of unfair lists by an association of labor unions to promote the boycott of a trucking company
which the Teamsters sought to organize. There the concern expressed by the court was that "the entire
union population of the city," not just the Teamsters, participated in the boycott. Id. at 100. Presumably
the direct economic self-interest of the latter would have insulated the boycott effort from judicial
interference had the other unions and their members not participated. Id.
"0See generally Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in LaborDisputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341, 349 (1938).
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v. Feintuch," the New York Court of Appeals refused to enjoin such picketing
by a butchers' union in front of a delicatessen selling nonunion meat, holding:
[I]t
is illegal to picket the place of business of one who is not himself a party

to an industrial dispute to persuade the public to withdraw its patronage generally
from the business for the purpose of coercing the owner to take sides in a controversy
in which he has no interest. .

.

. Within the limits of peaceful picketing, however,

picketing may be carried on not only against the manufacturer but against a nonunion
product sold by one in unity of interest with the manufacturer who is in the same
business for profit. Where a manufacturer pays less than union wages, both it and
the retailers who sell its products are in a position to undersell competitors who
pay the higher scale, and this may result in unfair reduction of the wages of union
members. Concededly the defendant union would be entitled to picket peacefully
the plant of the manufacturer. Where the manufacturer disposes of the product
through retailers in unity of interest with it, unless the union may follow the product
to the place where it is sold and peacefully ask the public to refrain from purchasing
it, the union would be deprived of a fair and proper means of bringing its plea
to the attention of the public.22
Changes wrought by Congress in the 1930's rapidly began to overshadow the
further development of these state common law principles. Following the failure
of early congressional attempts to insulate the activities of organized labor from
the reach of legal sanctions, "3 the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932,24
the amended Railway Labor Act in 1934,25 and the Wagner Act in 193526 marked
the beginning of the federal government's rise to preeminence as the regulator of
labor-management relations for most of American business and industry. The
Wagner Act, however, did not initially govern all aspects of labor-management
conflict. Indeed, it contained nothing which either outlawed or protected labor's
use of secondary boycotts, a fact which caused their control to remain in the hands
of the states until passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.27
2-276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).

Id. at 286, 11 N.E.2d at 912-13.
" Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), were intended to do away
with existing judicial precedent, both common law and that developed under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), under which union activities, including boycotts, had been subject
to sanction as conspiracies in restraint of trade. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). This effort
foundered on the judicial hostility to secondary boycotts, which led to a strikingly narrow interpretation of these sections by the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
24 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976)).
25 48 Stat. 1185 (1934) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1976)).
26 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976)).
27 State courts remained active in regulating secondary consumer boycotts for several decades after
passage of the National Labor Relations Act. It was not until NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 7 (1937), that the federal government was even deemed to have the power under the Commerce
Clause to reach labor relations in intrastate operations. Even after the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the states were found to have retained the power to deal with conduct, like consumer boycotts,
which was neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) overruled, 427 U.S. at 152. Only in 1959, after Congress
22
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TAFr-HARTEY

The first attempt to proscribe secondary boycotts at the federal level, subsection
8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 8 was directed solely at its most powerful and effective manifestation-work stoppages by sympathetic workers of employers having
business dealings with the primary employer.2

9

The statute was narrowly drawn.

When a forbidden object was present, such as "forcing . . . [a] person to . . .
cease doing business with any other person," the statute prohibited only those
boycotts in which secondary employees "engage[d]
in
a strike or a concerted refusal . . . to perform any services." It did not forbid
inducements, threats or other coercion aimed directly at the secondary employer.30
Unions remained free to encourage consumer boycotts of secondary employers,
and thus pressure them either to stop doing business with the primary employer
or to try to persuade the latter to accede to the union's wishes.
In early decisions under Taft-Hartley, the NLRB recognized the distinction between work stoppages and consumer boycotts and applied it in a straightforward
manner. For example, in Crowley's Milk Co., 3' the NLRB General Counsel refused
to issue an unfair labor practice complaint based upon Crowley's charges that appeals
were made to its customers not to buy its products during a wage strike. 32 Crowley's

had twice amended the National Labor Relations Act to encompass union unfair labor practices and
include secondary consumer boycotts, did the modern doctrine of federal preemption take shape. San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HAgv. L. REv. 1337 (1972). Despite the fact that states no longer have the power to
regulate the content of a secondary consumer boycott, they remain free, under certain circumstances,
to control its location. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978).
11 Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947).
2, It did this by making it "an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents"

Id.

(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in
a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities,
or to perform any services, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing.., any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person.

I3 See, e.g., Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952). Two other "loopholes" soon became
apparent in the statute: (a) because it only prohibited appeals to "employees" of any "employer,"
inducements could legally be made to persons who were either not "employees" or who did not work
for "employers," as these terms were defined in the National Labor Relations Act, e.g., agricultural
workers, government employees, railroad and airline employees and supervisors. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2),
(3) (1976); and (b) only "concerted refusals" to perform services were covered, making it permissible
to appeal to a single employee to cease work. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665
(1951). Pressure to close these "loopholes" led to the § 8(b)(4) amendments in the Landrum-Griffin
Act. See infra text in Part III.
2' 88 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1950), enforced, 208 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1953).
32 88 N.L.R.B. at 1049.
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termination of an employee who participated in this secondary
consumer picketing
33
was subsequently held to be an unfair labor practice.
It soon became obvious, however, that even picket lines nominally directed
at consumers often resulted in secondary employee work stoppages. The NLRB
was then faced with the difficult task of deciding whether the union responsible
for the picketing had intended to "induce or encourage" this result. As it has done
so many other times in its history, 34 the Board devised a presumption to substitute
for actual proof of such intent, which, of course, was practically impossible to
obtain. It held in Local 67, Teamsters (Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works,
Inc.), 35 that the union's placement of consumer pickets in front of entrances used
by both customers and secondary employees, without more, constituted inducement
and encouragement of employees to stop work within the meaning of subsection
36
8(b)(4).
The Board's treatment of consumer picketing during this period can probably
be explained as a response to the post-Taft-Hartley tactics of some unions,
camouflaging appeals to workers as consumer boycotts in an effort to frustrate
proof of intent. Notwithstanding such attempts to evade the existing secondary
boycott restrictions, however, the Board palpably over-reacted. Indeed, after the
decision in Teamsters (DallasGeneral Drivers), Local 745 (Associated Wholesale
Grocersof Dallas, Inc.), 37 it was clear that an illegal intent to induce a work stoppage
would be irrebutably presumed present in virtually any consumer picketing. The
Board majority in Dallas GeneralDrivers38 held that even picketing addressed solely
to consumers and limited to customer entrances at grocery stores, which unavoidably
were also used occasionally by some employees and deliverymen, violated subsection
8(b)(4). In so doing, the Board also sustained the Trial Examiner's refusal to admit
evidence that the union had advised representatives of the store's employees that
the purpose of the picketing was not to induce a work stoppage, as well as evidence
that no employees had in fact stopped work.3 9
33 95 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1951), enforced, 208 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1953). Affirming the NLRB's decision,
the Third Circuit framed the issue thusly: "whether ... (the striking employee's) participation in secondary
picketing was directed at coercion of employees of employers other than Crowley in the course of their
employment, contrary to the policy of Section 8(b)(4)(A)... or whether he did no more than attempt
to persuade consumers not to use Crowley products." 208 F.2d at 446. Accepting the NLRB's findings
of fact that he was engaged in the latter, it concluded there was "nothing which would make his reinstatement in any way inconsistent with the policies of the Act." Id. at 447.
14 See, e.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943) (work rules prohibiting employee
union solicitation outside working hours presumed to violate § 8(a)(1), absent "special circumstances").
:5 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953).
6 Id. at 299. Cf. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics, Local 459 (Royal Typewriter
Co.), 111 N.L.R.B. 317, 326 (1955) (Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report).
:7 118 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1957), enforced, 264 F.2d 642 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959).
" 118 N.L.R.B. at 1252.
" Id.
See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters (Peyton Packing Co.), 125 N.L.R.B. 531 (1959); United
Wholesale and Warehouse Employees, Local 261 (Perfection Mattress & Spring Co.), 125 N.L.R.B.
520 (1959), enforcement denied, 282 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Laundry, Linen Supply & Dry Cleaning
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Dissenting Member Murdock excoriated the majority for adopting this per se
rule of inducement:
If this evidence [of the union's efforts to limit its appeal to consumers] is insufficient to refute allegations in the complaint that the Respondent Union induced
employees of neutral employers to engage in a strike, then I cannot see how any
union can ever engage in customer picketing. Contrary to the majority, no decision
of the Board or of any court stands for the extreme proposition implicit in the
majority's decision that any picket line, wherever located, regardless of the message
communicated by the pickets, and regardlessof all attempts by the picketing union
to limit its picketing to consumers as distinguishedfrom employees "necessarily
invites employees to make common cause with the strikers" and "constitutes inducement of employees within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(A). . . ." There is,
I believe, a limit to the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the fact of
picketing with regard to the intent of the picketing union and the effect of its picket
line upon employees.40
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the first appellate
court to review the new presumption,4' 1 rejected the Board's notion that the "natural
and probable consequences" of consumer picketing was to induce a work stoppage
and therefore refused to accept the Board's finding of such intent, absent actual

evidence to that effect.4 2 Most other courts presented with this issue responded
43
similarly.

The Board's presumption however, was limited to the act of picketing. Other
forms of consumer publicity such as handbills, fliers and pamphlets, were not conDrivers, Local 928 (Southern Service Co., Ltd.), 118 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1957), enforced, 262 F.2d 617
(9th Cir. 1958).
'0 Id. at 1259-60 (emphasis in original).
" Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, Local 459 (Royal Typewriter
Co.), 111 N.L.R.B. 317, enforcement denied, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert, denied, 351 U.S, 962
(1956).
In Royal Typewriter striking service personnel of the primary employer established consumer picket
lines at its larger commercial customers and picketed independent repair companies which were performing
the "struck repair work" for some of the primary customers. The Board found both picket lines in
violation of § 8(b)(4). The Second Circuit decided both were protected-the consumer picket line because
of the absence of proof of intent to induce a work stoppage, the picketing at the repair companies
because of the "ally doctrine." As to the latter, see Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects Local
231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
42 228 F.2d at 561. Cf. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 145, 191 F.2d 65, 68 (2d
Cir. 1951).
41 Local 50, Bakery Workers Int'l Union (Arnold Bakers, Inc.), 115 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1956), enforcement denied, 245 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1957); International Union of United Brewery Workers, Local
366 (Adolph Coors Co.), 121 N.L.R.B. 271, enforcement denied, 272 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1959); United
Wholesale and Warehouse Employees Local 261, 125 N.L.R.B. 520, enforcement denied, 282 F.2d 824
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Getreu v. Hatter's Union, 41 L.R.R.M. 2429 (W.D. Ky. 1957) (N.L.R.A. § 10(l)
preliminary injunction denied); but see Teamsters Local 745 (Associated Wholesale Grocers of Dallas,
Inc.), 118 N.L.R.B. 1251, enforced in part, 264 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814
(1959); Teamsters Local 928 (Southern Service Co., Ltd.), 118 N.L.R.B. 1435, enforced, 262 F.2d 617
(9th Cir. 1958).
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sidered per se inducements to secondary employees to stop work." The Board's
decision in Dallas General Drivers5 put it this way:
In our opinion, the distribution of handbills to the general public appealing
for a consumer boycott, unlike picketing, does not necessarily invite or instigate
a work stoppage or a refusal to perform services. As the Supreme Court observed:
Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same
information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the
very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences,
different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked6
and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word.1
Thus, by 1959 (the eve of the Landrum-Griffin amendments), the NLRB's interpretation of subsection 8(b)(4) had already expanded the original provision to
encompass all consumer picketing as an unavoidable, and thus illegal inducement

to secondary employees, while other forms of consumer-oriented publicity (not
resulting in work stoppages) were permitted. It is in this historical context that
the legislative maneuvering which led to the Landrum-Griffin amendments must

be viewed.
III.

Tim LANDRuM-GRmN ACT: LEGISLATIVE OVERKILL?

The political climate in 1959, heated to the boiling point by the McClellan Committee's investigation of union racketeering, 4 7 was not conducive to reasoned
deliberations on amendments intended to eliminate the "loopholes ' "4 8 in TaftHarley's secondary boycott provisions.41 Congress was caught between the forces
of organized labor, which opposed any legislation at all, 50 and powerful business
interests seemingly intent on converting widespread antiunion sentiment into legisla5

tion which would hamstring labor's ability to organize and exert economic pressure. '

" Teamsters Local 745 (Associated Wholesale Grocers of Dallas, Inc.), 118 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1254-55
(1957); Cf. Casket Makers Local 3128, 114 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1344-45 (1955).
41 118 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1957).
46 Id. at 1254-55 (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 465).
4' The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. See
1 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 5.03[d] (1978).
" See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
41 Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1086,
1087 (1960).
70 See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 9691-97 (1959) (AFL-CIO policy position regarding proposed legislation), reprintedin II NLRB LEcSiATrvE HISTORY OF THE LABoR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AN DiscLosuRE
ACT OF 1959 at 1491-97 (1960) (hereinafter cited as LEois. HisT. LMRDA).
11 105 CONG. REC. APP.5652-53 (1959) (Rep. Hiestand's insertion of a Wall Street Journal article
concerning a Teamster consumer boycott of a dairy cooperative, preceded by his descriptions of "small
merchants . . . victimized by a powerful labor union;" "racketeering practices;" and "blackmail"),

reprinted in II LEGIs. HIST. LMRDA 1758-59 (1960).

Professor Aaron characterized the arguments of business groups seeking greater restrictions on
picketing and boycotts as "patently misleading and appeal[ing] to emotion rather than reason." 74
HARv. L. Rv.at 1081.
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Pro-labor legislators in the Senate acted first. In January, 1959, the KennedyErvin Bill5" was introduced. Its supporters were only interested in reforming internal
union practices-the racketeering and corruption exposed by the McClellan

Committee." They offered no amendments to subsection 8(b)(4). The bill ultimately
passed by the Senate in April, 1959, 4 was equally silent on such changes."
Most of the significant legislation introduced in the House of Representatives

during the 1959 session,56 on the other hand, included sweeping amendments to
S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I. LEois. Hisr. LMRDA 29 (1960).
s 105 CONG. Rac. 816-19 (1959), reprinted in II LGIS. HIsT. LMRDA 968-72 (1960).

S. 1555, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959), reprinted in I LEois. Hist. LMRDA 516 (1960). This
bill, introduced by Senator Kennedy, co-sponsor of the original legislation, S. 505, was essentially the
same bill as amended in Committee. On April 25, 1959, S. 1555, as amended, was passed by the Senate,
90-1 and sent to the House of Representatives. 105 CONC. REc. 6048 (1959), reprinted in II Laos.
HIsT. LMRDA 1257 (1960).
" There were Senate advocates fox broadening the scope of § 8(b)(4) to reach consumer boycotts.
The Republican administration introduced its bill, S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in
I LEcIs. HisT. LMRDA 84 (1960), which paralleled H.R. 8342. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying
text. In addition, Senator McClellan sponsored S. 1384, "A bill amending the provisions of the NLRA
and the LMRA, 1947, relating to secondary boycotts." 105 CoNG. REc. 3520-21 (1959), reprinted in
I LEIs. HIsT. LMRDA 327 (1960). S. 1384 would have expanded § 8(b)(4) to prohibit union efforts
"to exert or attempt to exert any economic or other coercion against, or offer any inducement to,
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce" if such efforts furthered an
illegal object. Id.
Speaking in support of his bill, Senator McClellan stated: "This bill would amend Section 8(b)(4)
of the Taft-Hartley Act to prohibit certain types of coercion of the employer and, particularly, to prevent
coercion by picketing at the premises of a secondary employer in order to prevent customers from
doing business with the employer primarily involved in a labor dispute. Such practices are unjust and
impose suffering and hardship on innocent parties who are helpless to protect themselves." 105 CoNG.
Rc. 3524 (1959), reprinted in II LEois. HIST. LMRDA 1007 (1960).
Senator McClellan also proposed an amendment, substantially identical to S. 1384, during debate
on S. 1555. It was defeated, 50-41, 105 CoNG. REc. 5975 (1959), reprinted in II LEois. HIST. LMRDA
1198 (1960), but the Senator's example of what it was intended to prevent was probably indicative
of the sentiments of the proponents of changes to § 8(b)(4) in both houses of Congress:
I point out that we have cases of merchants who for 20 years, 10 years, or a long period
of time, may have been handling a particular brand of product. A merchant may have built
his business around the product, such as the John Deere plows or some kind of machinery
from some other country. The merchant may have built up his trade entirely on th[at] product
....
The merchant may have a competitor who is handling a competitive product made
by another manufacturer, which serves the same function, but which is a different brand
and is manufactured by someone else. In one of these plants there may be a strike, and
the union may picket the merchant who is handling the product of the struck plant. The
union may say to the merchant, "You cannot sell this product. If you do we will picket
your place of business. Thus you will not be able to get your supplies, because the Teamsters
will not cross the picket line."
In addition, the merchant's customers would be embarrassed. They would be harassed.
They would see the picket sign. What would the sign say? It would say "Unfair to labor."
How is the merchant unfair to labor? It is simply a case of the merchant not being willing
to stop handling a product which he has been handling for 20 years and on which he has
built his business. That is a secondary boycott which, it seems to me, ought to be prohibited.
105 CONG. REC. 5971 (1959), reprinted in II LEaIs. HIsT. LMRDA 1194 (1960).
" The major labor reform bills filed in the House of Representatives during the first session of
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the secondary boycott provisions. Title VII of the Landrum-Griffin Bill, which was
passed by the House on August 14, 1959,7 contained two major modifications.

First, it closed the "loopholes" which had been identified in connection with union
appeals for secondary work stoppages." Those amendments, to what is now subsec-

tion 8(b)(4)(i), were not particularly controversial, it being agreed even by the Senate
proponents of the Kennedy-Ervin Bill that there had "never been any dispute about

the desirability of plugging these artificial loopholes." ' 59 The second change was
an entirely different matter. The House proposed to add a new subsection 8(b)(4)(ii),
making it an unfair labor practice "to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce" in furtherance of an
illegal objective.60 Supporters and opponents alike understood that this language
was intended to prohibit, inter alia, consumer boycotts of secondary employers. 6'
Matters came to a head with the passage of Landrum-Griffin in the House

of Representatives. This brought about the convening of a Senate-House conference
the 86th Congress were: the Kearns Bill, H.R. 3540, 105 CONG. REc. 1330 (1959), reprintedin II LEGis.
HIST. LMRDA 996 (1960); the Elliot Bill, H.R. 8342, 105 CONG. REc. 12860 (1959), reprinted in II
LEoIs. HIST. LMRDA 1517 (1960); the Landrum Bill, H.R. 8400, 105 CONG. REC. 13125 (1959), reprinted
in II LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA 1527 (1960); and the Griffin Bill (identical to the Landrum Bill), H.R.
8401, reprinted in II LEGIs. HIST. LMRDA 1527 (1960).
5'On August 11, 1959, the House voted to strike the contents of S. 1555 and substitute H.R.
8342 (the Elliot Bill), 105 CONG. REc. 14175-80 (1959), reprintedin II LEGIS. HisT. LMRDA 1548-53
(1960). Three days later the House, having voted to substitute H.R. 8400 (Landrum-Griffin) for the
H.R. 8342, again voted to strike S.1555, to be replaced by the amended H.R. 8342 and to request
a conference with the Senate. 105 CONG. REc. 14541 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIS. HIsT. LMRDA 1702
(1960).
" See supra note 30.
" Comments of Senator Kennedy, 105 CoNG. REc. 16413 (1950), reprinted in II LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA
1431 (1960); see also, Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1086, 1114 (1960).
60 H.R. 8400, § 705, 105 CONG. REc. 63 (1959), reprintedin I LEGIs. HIsT. LMRDA 680 (1960).
61 President Eisenhower had made a televised White House address August 6, 1959, little more
than a week before the House passed Landrum-Griffin. In it, he expressly condemned secondary consumer
picketing:
Chief among the abuses from which Americans need protection are the oppressive practices
of coercion.... Take another company-let us say a furniture manufacturer. The employees
vote against joining a particular union. Instead of picketing the furniture plant itself,
unscrupulous organization officials, in this case, use another scheme. They picket the store
which sell the furniture this plant manufactures. The purpose is to prevent those stores from
handling that furniture.
How can anyone justify this kind of pressure against stores which are not involved in
any dispute? They are innocent bystanders. This kind of action is designed to make the stores
bring pressure on the furniture plant and its employees-to force those employees into a
union they do not want. This is an example of a secondary boycott.
I want that sort of thing stopped. So does America. 105 CONG. REc. A8488-89 (1959), reprinted
in II LEcis. HIsT. LMRDA 1842-43 (1960).
The President's remarks did not take into account that such conduct had previously been held
to be unlawful union coercion of employees' rights to organize under § 8(b)(2), of the Taft-Hartley
Act. See Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953), affirmed on other grounds,
347 U.S. 501 (1954).
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committee to resolve the differences between the two legislative bodies. When the
conference met in late August, 1959, the prospect of outlawing consumer boycotts
was a major item of contention. Senator Kennedy, the committee chairman, had
sought instructions from the Senate to insert a limitation exempting consumer publicity from the reach of the new subsection 8(b)(4)(ii). 61 By September 2, after twelve
days of fierce debate, 3 the conference committee had completed work. Its report
was submitted to the Senate that day and agreed to by the upper house the following
afternoon. 6" The pro-labor forces had been unable to secure Senator Kennedy's
compromise, which would have permitted all forms of consumer publicity; the supporters of Landrum-Griffin had stood firm in their insistence that consumer
picketing, at least, was to be eliminated. 6 What was agreed to, the "publicity proviso," appears to have been cobbled
together with little thought beyond addressing the most obvious example of consumer
boycott activity confronting the legislators in 1959. Its terms were anything but
a model of clarity:
Provided ...nothing contained in such paragraph [8(b)(4)] shall be construed
to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising

the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product

or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has
a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity
does n6t have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other
than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up,
deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services at the establishment
of the employer engaged in such distribution ....66

The Landrum-Griffin Act, including the amendments to subsection 8(b)(4), passed both houses of Congress and was signed by President Eisenhower on September
14, 1959.67 Legislative history leaves little doubt that both supporters and opponents
of the Act's consumer boycott compromise believed that the new subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)
covered all consumer boycotts and that the publicity proviso exempted only truthful
nonpicketing publicity which did not have the effect of inducing work stoppages. 68
Senate Resolution 181, submitted by Senator Kennedy, contained this caveat:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection (6) shall be construed . . .to prohibit
ptblicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an establishment is operated, or goods are produced or distributed, by an employer engaged in a labor
dispute, without inducing employees to refuse to pick up, deliver or transport any goods,
or perform any services at such establishment.
105 CONG. REc. 15906 (1959), reprinted in II LEacs. HIsT. LMRDA 1383 (1960).
6 105 CONrG. REC. 15901, 16413 (1959), reprintedin II LEocs. Hisr. LMRDA 1378, 1431 (1960).
1"105 CONG. Rrc. 16435 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIs. Hist. LMRDA 1452-53 (1960).
61 105 CONG. REc. 14339 (1959), reprinted in II LEaIS. HIsT. LMRDA 1615 (1960) (remarks
of
Congressman Griffin).
66 61 Stat. 136, 141 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)).
62

67

73 Stat. 519, 553 (1959).

' See, e.g., the comments of Senator Kennedy, conference committee chair:
Under the language of the conference, we agreed there would not be picketing at a secon-
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Many of the Act's backers doubtless felt that singling out consumer picketing
was justifiable simply because it removed the most noxious remaining method of

embarrasing and harrassing neutral employers. 69 There are also indications present,
however, that other supporters believed, as did the majority of the NLRB at that

time, 70 that it should be outlawed because any picketing created an unavoidable
appeal for sympathetic secondary employee work stoppages. 7' To the extent that

the exclusion of picketing from the publicity proviso is due to this latter rationale,
the new amendment contained a remarkable overkill. It had been provided elsewhere
therein that any publicity, including picketing, which had "an effect" of causing
a secondary work stoppage would by that fact alone be an unfair7 2labor practice,
whether or not it could be shown that this effect was intended.
IV.

SERvETIE AND TREE FRUITS: LIMITED VICTORIES FOR
ORGANIZED LABOR

With the passage of Landrum-Griffin, it seemed that federal labor law prohibited all secondary picketing and permitted other secondary consumer-oriented
publicity only if (a) it informed the public that the secondary employers "distributed"
"products" which were "produced by" the primary employer; (b) it was truthful;
73
and (c) it did not have "an effect of inducing" secondary work stoppages.
The latter two requirements, truthfulness and no secondary work stoppage effect,
were fairly straightforward and, in fact, simply incorporated concepts familiar to

dary site. What was permitted was the giving out of handbills or information through the
radio, and so forth.
105 Cong. Rec. 16254-55 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIS. Hisr. LMRDA 1388-89 (1960); or, the observation of his Republican colleague, Senator Dirksen:
It bars a union from picketing a retail store to advertise that the store is handling the
goods of a firm the union was striking, but permits other forms of such advertising-handbills,
for example-if they do not cause the store's employees to stop working or prevent pickups
and deliveries.
105 CONG. Rac. A8275 (1959), reprintedin II LEGIs. HIsT. LMRDA 1823 (1960). To the same effect
are the following remarks and analyses published in the Congressional Record: 105 CoNG. Rac. A8372
(1959), reprinted in II LEGIS. HisT. LMRDA 1834 (1960) (speech by Sen. Paul Douglas); 105 CONrG.
REc. (1959), reprintedin II LEGIs. HIST. LMRDA 1857 (1960) (analysis of the LMRDA by Sen. Barry
Goldwater); 105 CONG. REc. A8464 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIs. HIST. LMRDA 1842 (1960) (report
on the LMRDA by Rep. Jessica Weis).
" See supra note 68.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
11 Thus, Senator Morse, a staunch opponent of Landrum-Griffin, had this to say about the rationale
of excluding picketing from the publicity proviso:
[B]y excepting picketing, it acts on the assumption that consumer picketing inevitably
and always causes employees not to work as well as customers not to buy. This is a false
assumption, and experience has demonstrated its falsity.
105 CONG. REc. 16398 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIs. Hisr. LMRDA 1427 (1960); see also Senator
McClellan's remarks at the end of supra note 55.
,1 See supra text accompanying note 66 for the text of publicity proviso.
73 Id.
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common law" and to preexisting federal labor law, respectively. 7" The picketing
ban and the required producer-distributor nexus were another matter however, since
Congress had never before attempted to restrict pure consumer picketing 76 or to
limit either the employer objects of a consumer boycott or the circumstances in
which labor might resort to it.
The first chapter in the history of the newly-expanded subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)
and its publicity proviso is the NLRB's efforts to define the scope and meaning
of these new restrictions, a phase which culminated in the 1964 Supreme Court
decisions, NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 77 and NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits).7 As will be seen, the Board applied the
picketing ban unquestioningly, while largely ignoring the limitations implicit in the
inartfully drawn "producer-product-distributor" language which defined the
proviso's reach.
A.

The NLRB and Consumer Picketing-A Literal Interpretation

The Board's first opportunity to apply the Landrum-Griffin amendments to
consumer picketing came on the remand of Perfection Mattress & Spring Co.
(PerfectionMattressI1).71 The union contended that its picketing at retail furniture
stores-asking only that the public not purchase mattresses manufactured by the
primary employer-was constitutionally-protected free speech, 8" and that only
picketing which urged consumers not to patronize the secondary employer at all
gave rise to unlawful "coercion" within the meaning of subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)8
Both the Board 82 and the Fifth Circuit83 rejected this attempt to preserve a limited
sphere of lawful consumer picketing. Despite the fact that the sign carried by the
single picket was directed solely at customers, 8 that the picketing was scheduled
to avoid employees arriving or leaving work, 85 and that there were no secondary
employee work stoppages, 81 the NLRB upheld the General Counsel's contention
" See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 936-37 (4th ed. 1971) (defamation
and misrepresentation may affect the defendant's privilege to interfere with the business relations of
another).
75 See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
7' See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
77 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
7- 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
" Retail, Wholesale and Dept. Store Union, Local 261 (Perfection Mattress & Spring Co.), 129
N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960), motion to dismiss denied, 48 L.R.R.M. 2167 (5th Cir. 1961), supp. decision,
134 N.L.R.B. 931 (1961), enforcement denied in part, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
80 129 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
Id. at 1022-23.
I2 at 1024.
Id.
:3
4

Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
129 N.L.R.B. at 1017.

:S Id.
86 Id.
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that violations of both subsection 8(b)(4)(i)(B) (inducement of secondary employees)87
and subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) (direct coercion of the secondary employers)88 had occurred. In addressing this second finding, the Board looked no further than the
plain language of the new amendment and its publicity proviso 8 to find that any
"ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site" was now prohibited.8
With the coming of the Kennedy Board, the NLRB finally dropped its insistence,
repeated in Perfection Mattress II, that consumer picketing also unavoidably gave
rise to secondary employee inducements, 8 ' but steadfastly continued to refuse to
permit any form of consumer picketing. 92 While recognizing that handbilling and
other forms of "pure" publicity were authorized,9 3 the Board was quick to strike
down union activity which had the same effect as picketing, even though it lacked
the actual placards."4 The Board also gave full rein to the perceived congressional
intent to remove consumer picketing as a source of coercion by holding that threats
to picket were themselves violations of subsection 8(b)(4)(ii), 9 and by upholding
employer-retailers had actually
such charges without any showing that secondary
96
ceased to stock the primary's products.
B.

The NLRB and the Scope of the "Publicity Proviso"

In R & B Building Corp. 7 the Board initially seemed inclined toward a narrow
and literal interpretation of the publicity proviso. There, weekend consumer picketing
of the secondary employer's housing subdivision had been undertaken by the

, Id. at 1017-18.
Id. at 1022-23.
'9 Id.
9 Id. at 1023.
"

11Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers, Twin City Local 61 (Minneapolis House Furnishing
Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 41 (1961), enforcement denied, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1964). In Minneapolis
House Furnishing Co., the Board majority reflected the influence of the newly-confirmed Kennedy
nominees, who moved quickly to overrule the presumption of PerfectionMattress II, holding that consumer
picketing was not per se "inducement or encouragement" to stop work within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(i),
but that it was "an issue to be resolved in the light of all the evidence in a particular case." 132 N.L.R.B.
at 41.
82 Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits Labor Relations Comm.,
Inc.), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961), enforcement denied, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962), vacated, 377
U.S. 58 (1964); Blueprint Photostat & Photo Employees Union, Local 249 (East Photo Lab), 135 N.L.R.B.
1090 (1962).
9' Plumbers Local Union 519 (Babcock Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 596 (1962).
14 Service & Maintenance Employees Union, Local 399 (The William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.), 136 N.L.R.B. 431 (1962).
9' New York Typographical Union, No. 6 (Gavrin Press Corp.), 141 N.L.R.B. 1209, 1213 (1963).
86 General Teamsters Local 324 (Cascade Employers Ass'n Inc.), 144 N.L.R.B. 836, 839 (1963);
Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees' Local 680 (Durling Dairy Distributors), 145 N.L.R.B. 165 (1963),
supp. decision, 147 N.L.R.B. 506 (1964); Local 559, International Bhd. of Teamsters (Anopolsky &
Son, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 722 (1963).
"7 Local 1921, United Bhd. of Carpenters (R & B Bldg. Corp.), 131 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1961).
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carpenters' union, unhappy that the carpentry work on the homes for sale therein
had been done by a nonunion partnership. 98 The Trial Examiner had observed that,
even assuming the picketing was otherwise lawful, the publicity proviso was not
available as a shield because- the primary employer was "performing a service,"
not "producing a product for distribution." 99 The proviso was thus seen as reflecting
congressional intent to protect only publicity directed at secondary employers who
distributed tangible "products.""' The Board affirmed this aspect of the Trial Examiner's intermediate report without elaboration.' 0 '
This distinction between unprotected publicity if the primary employer provided
a "service", versus protected publicity if it produced a "product" was short-lived.
By mid-1961, the new members appointed to the NLRB by President Kennedy had
begun to reorient the perspectives of federal labor law, often by deliberately overruling the precedents of the "Eisenhower Board.""' 2 The new majority, in the

Lohman Sales Co. decision," 3 lost no time in junking the R & B Bldg. Corp. distinction in favor of a much broader construction of the publicity proviso.
Lohman was a wholesale distributor of cigarettes, cigars, other tobacco products,
candy and related merchandise. "° The union representing Lohman's employees,
having been unable to negotiate a satisfactory collective bargaining agreement, called
a strike, and picketed Lohman's premises."05 Going beyond this primary activity,
the union also asked the retail stores served by Lohman not to stock its goods."06
Id. at 1058-59.
Id. at 1067 (Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report).
,oo
The Trial Examiner reasoned as follows:
In a sense, R & B by performing the carpentry work on Spar's houses was producing
a product distributed by Spar but this result is reached only by stretching the meaning of
the words used beyond their accurate and customary usage. R & B was essentially performing
a service for Spar and was not producing a product for distribution. The service was comparable to that of the electrician who wired the houses or the painter who painted the walls,
neither of whom was producing a product. Congress used the words "product or products"
advisedly in the proviso and was not at that point dealing with services. When Congress
intended to embrace situations relating not only to the handling of products but also to the
performance of service or of business not restricted to product handling, it chose appropriate
language. It is reasonable to conclude that if Congress had intended a wider application of
the proviso it would have stated that publicity other than picketing was permissible to advise
consumers and union members that a product or products or labor or services are produced,
furnished, or performed by an employer with whom the union has a primary dispute and
are distributed or used by another employer. Moreover, the legislative history of Section 8(b)(4)
and the proviso sustain the view that the proviso was addressed to product boycotts in the
usual sense of that term.
Id. at 1067 (footnotes omitted).
"

101Id. at 1052-53.
202 See, e.g., Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers, Twin City Local 61, 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961);
Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).

101International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 537, 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
1*4 Id.
at 902.

"I Id. at 904.
116 Id. at 902.
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Some of those who refused were then subjected to handbilling asking the public
not to purchase Lohman's products."0 7
The Board was asked to decide three issues arising under the publicity proviso:
whether the union's handbilling was "truthful" within the meaning of the statute;
whether the handbilling was tantamount to picketing; and, whether the proviso
applied to employers who did not "produce" goods in the sense of fabricating
or manufacturing them.' 8 The union's conduct was held to be protected in all
respects.'0 9 The Board refused to restrict the proviso's coverage to the narrow fact
pattern suggested by the statutory language (applicable only if the primary employer
actually manufactured products), opting instead for an interpretation that would
encompass virtually any primary employer. Relying in the first instance upon a
construction of the terms "product" and "produced" it held:
[I]t seems clear that, so far as human effort is concerned, labor is the prime requisite
of one who produces. A wholesaler, such as Lohman, need not be the actual
manufacturer to add his labor in the form of capital, enterprise, and service to
the product he furnishes the retailers. In this sense, therefore, Lohman, as the other
employers who "handled" the raw materials of the product before him, is one
of the producers of the cigarettes distributed by his customers. A contrary view
would attach a special importance to one form of labor over another and attempt
to isolate fabricators of products from those who otherwise add to its value. Excluded
as non-producers might be those companies engaged in the assembly of machine
parts; the soft drink bottling industry; communications, such as newspapers,
magazines, and TV stations, which produce products of an abstract rather than
physical nature. If our dissenting colleague is right, vast numbers of our working
population produce nothing. Their thought, labor, or business enterprise is not
a "product." We do not believe that the plain meaning of the words "product"
and "produced" requires the Board to draw an uncertain line between those
employers engaged essentially or only incidentally in the fabrication of products;
between those employers who create a new product or embellish an old one; between
products of the imagination and those that can be seen, touched, or smelled."10
,

Id. at 903.
Id. at 906-08.
208 The Board rejected the contention that handbilling was the equivalent of picketing for purposes
of the proviso. Rather, this was held to be the very type of publicity Congress explicity intended to
protect. Id. at 906.
With regard to the claim of untruthfulness, the Board established the following standard:
Even if these handbills were susceptible of an interpretation that the store handbilled
purchased all the items listed thereon from Lohman, which was not the case, they were substantially accurate in their representations, as appears from the Intermediate Report. And when
[one of the secondary employees] notified the Union that the handbill was not altogether
accurate in its case, the Union promptly remedied the matter ....
[The proviso does not
require that a handbiller be an insurer that the content of the handbill is 100 percent correct,
and ... where, as here, there is no evidence of an intent to deceive and there has not been
a substantial departure from fact, the requirements of the proviso are met.
Id. at 905-06 (emphasis in original).
120Id. at 907.
2o0
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Buttressing this conclusion with references to the legislative history,"' the Board
concluded:
Reading the statute as a whole, there is not the slightest reason to conclude that
Congress was concerned with permitting truthful publicity with respect to products
derived from manufacturers, but was unconcerned with such publicity as it affected
products from other wholesalers, such as Lohman. Nor, as indicated above, is there
any reason to suppose from the legislative history that an arbitrary and purposeless
distinction of this type was intended. Accordingly, we shall accord the words "product" and "produced" their natural and accepted interpretation set forth above." 2

In Lohman, the Board thus rejected limiting the right to publicize disputes
solely to those cases involving a manufacturer of tangible products. Instead, any
primary employer who created or added value to products by the application of
"labor in the form of capital, enterprise and service" was henceforth a legitimate
target of nonpicketing publicity. This principle was soon applied to protect the
publicizing of disputes involving not only distributors," 3 but also employers who
serviced equipment," 4 installed machinery,' 5 and advertised the products of
others.'

6

The proviso could also have been interpreted to authorize publicity at the secondary employer's place of business solely as a means of asking consumers to boycott
the primary employer's product," 7 but not to seek a boycott of the entire secon9
dary business. ' 8 The Board held in Middle South Broadcasting,"1
however, that
even calls for total consumer boycotts were protected.
The dispute in Middle South was with the owner of a radio station. The union
involved had distributed leaflets to its members, to local companies and to the public,
urging them not to patronize any businesses that advertised on the station. 2 The
Id. at 907-08.

Id. at 908.
,, International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 968, 133 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1961); Local 848, Wholesale
Delivery Drivers & Salesmen's Union (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1501 (1961), enforcement denied
sub nom. Servette Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
"' Radio-TV Service Technicians, Local 202, IBEW (Packard Bell Electronics Corp.), 132 N.L.R.B.
1049 (1961).
Pllumbers & Pipefitters Local 142 (Shop-Rite Roods, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 307 (1961).
,' Radio and Television Eng'rs Local 662 (Middle South Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1698
(1961).
"'
The ambiguity of the statute ("publicity ... for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
...

that a product or products ...

produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has

a primary dispute ... are distributed by another employer") arguably could have supported such a
limited range of permissible publicity.
"' It was to be seen later that such a distinction was impossible in the case of "merged" products
or single product retailers. See infra text in subparts IV. E. 1. and 3.
"9 Radio and Television Eng'rs Local 662 (Middle South Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1698
(1961).
"20Id. at 1701.
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NLRB's General Counsel argued that calling for a boycott of the secondary
employer's entire business exceeded the law's protection.12 ' The Board did not agree.
Believing its conclusion supported by the legislative history,' the majority held
that even though nonpicketing publicity seeking a total secondary consumer boycott
would otherwise have been impermissible restraint or coercion under subsection
8(b)(4)(ii), 23 it was nonetheless protected by the publicity proviso.' 24 The Board
thus pronounced itself willing to countenance direct, possibly crippling, action against
the primary employer's customers and retail dealers, as long as the actors were
the individual members of the consuming public, responding to nonpicketing publicity. This broad secondary appeal quickly proved itself to be an effective economic
tool in cases where the primary employer did not produce actual products sold
construction,' 25 maintenance
at retail to the public, but engaged in such activities2 as
26 advertising2 7 and delivery service.' 8
and repairs,'
C.

Servette-the Spirit Prevails

Lohman's expansive interpretation of the publicity proviso soon came under
attack in the courts of appeals. In Great Western BroadcastingCorp.,,29 the Ninth
Circuit rejected the Board's conclusion that a union boycott of retail stores which
sold products advertised on the primary employer's television station was protected.
The Board had relied on its Middle South holding that such advertisers were "producers" of the products advertised, and that the retailers of these products
"distributed" them within the meaning given this term in Lohman. 3 ' The court
was convinced, however, that providing advertising "services" was not the production of a product as contemplated by Congress. 3 '
The Ninth Circuit then invoked the Great Western Broadcastinz holding to
strike down secondary handbilling in Servette Inc.,' 32 a case remarkably similar
to Lohman, wherein the union's dispute with a wholesale distributor had led to
121 Id.

at 1704-05.
"I Id. at 1715-17 (Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report).
123
124

Id. at 1705.
Id.

2I Local 712, IBEW (Golden Dawn Foods), 134 N.L.R.B. 812 (1961). Cf. Local 73, IBEW (Northwestern Constr. of Wash., Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 498 (196).
126 McLeod v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Conf. Bd., Local 459 (Remington
Rand), 49 L.R.R.M. 2270 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 300 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1962).
," American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, San Francisco Local (Great Western Broadcasting Corp.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1961), enforcement denied, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962).
121 United Plant Guard Workers (Houston Armored Car Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 110 (1962).
,29Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.), denying enforcement
to 134 N.L.R.B. 1617 (1961).

134 N.L.R.B. at 1621.
,31 310 F.2d at 596.
"'

m Wholesale Delivery Drivers & Salesmen, Local 848 (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1501, vacated,
310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
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handbilling at the retail stores which sold its products. In turn, Servette, and a
companion case from the D. C. Circuit, Tree Fruits,'33 were selected by the Supreme
Court as vehicles to interpret subsection 8(b)(4)(ii) and the publicity proviso.
Justice Brennan, speaking in Servette for a unanimous court, embraced the
Board's Lohman doctrine, holding that the publicity proviso's purpose-safeguarding
the unions' freedom to appeal for public support-could not be achieved if disputes
with actual manufacturers or processors were the only ones covered.' 3 In addition
to pointing out that Congress had previously used the term "produced" in other
statutes to apply to the activities of distributors,'35 Justice Brennan found support
for his view of congressional intent within the 1959 session of Congress itself:
Moreover, a primary target of the 1959 amendments was the secondary boycotts
conducted by the Teamsters Union, which ordinarily represents employees not of
manufacturers, but of motor carriers. There is nothing in the legislative history
which suggests that the protection of the proviso was intended to be any narrower
in coverage than the prohibition to which it is an exception, and we see no basis
for attributing such an incongruous purpose to Congress.3 6
No serious questions have arisen since this decision concerning the publicity
proviso's applicability to primary employers. Servette established the broadest possible standard for determining which of the primary employers could be the ultimate
targets of secondary consumer (nonpicketing) publicity: all of them could be, without
regard to whether they manufactured or distributed tangible products, or whether
they provided only "services." This result is surely sound. To have held otherwise,
that unions could not publicize disputes with nonmanufacturing employers, would
have raised grave first amendment problems, unless at least certain kinds of publicity,
such as newspaper advertisements and union unfair lists, could be considered noncoercive and therefore not at all within the coverage of subsection 8(b)(4)(ii). ' 1
Servette was also a salutory decision from a practical standpoint. By ignoring
the indefensible strictures suggested by the unhappy choice of statutory language,
the Court put in place a predictable, uniform standard which parties to labor disputes
could understand, and on which they could rely. To the extent that ambiguities
remained, they centered on the prohibition of picketing and on the hitherto unconsidered question of which secondary employers could be deemed to "distribute"
the primary's "products." The former issue was to boil into controversy in Servette's
companion case, but the latter question lay dormant for almost two decades.

"' NRLB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits Labor Relations Comm., Inc.), 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See infra text accompanying notes 138-64.

377 U.S. at 55.
13

136

Id.

Id.

One type of publicity, product picketing, was held to be "noncoercive" in the TreeFruitsdecision.
See infra text accompanying the discussion in notes 168-88.
"'
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Tree Fruits-PruningCongressionalIntent

Servette's interpretation of the permissible employer-objects of nonpicketing
publicity was relatively uncontroversial, but the decision in the Tree Fruits case,
handed down the same day, was a bombshell. Tree Fruits dealt with secondary
'
consumer picketing. Not unsurprisingly, given the wording of the statute 38
supported
39
4
by a fairly extensive legislative history,' the NLRB ' and the commentators' 4 '
had assumed that Congress intended to outlaw all such picketing. Meanwhile, the
AFL-CIO had doggedly pursued the legal theory first broached in Perfection
Mattress' 2-that picketing limited to the "struck product" was constitutionally
protected and should not be considered "coercion" under subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).143
This argument fell upon deaf ears when Tree Fruitswas heard by the Board, which
found a subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation in the union's efforts, through consumer
picketing, to persuade Safeway supermarket customers not to purchase the primary's
apples.' 4 " Even though successful efforts were made by the picketers to prevent
secondary employee work stoppages and to inform both the supermarkets and the
public that a total consumer boycott of Safeway was not sought, the Board held
that the product picketing "threaten[ed], coerce[ed] or restrain[ed] persons within
the meaning of subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)" and that it was intended to "force ... Safeway
to reduce or to discontinue altogether its purchases of such apples from the struck
145
employers"-an illegal object.
Labor's arguments made headway on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, 4 6 where concern with the first amendment implications of a total ban on consumer picketing
underlay the decision. Judge Bazelon's opinion distinguished the facts before him
from "signal" picketing, which is directed at unionized employees and calculated
to produce certain results "irrespective of the ideas being disseminated." 4 4 Noting
that the publicity picketing "may well be . . . closer to the core notion of constitutionally protected free speech," than such "signal" picketing,' 8 and that this was
a device regularly used by many of society's non-labor groups to protest various

'

1o

See supra text accompanying notes 60 and 66 for the text of § 8(b)(4)(ii) and the publicity proviso.
See supra Part III.
See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 49, at 1114 (1960); Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Mwn,. L. REv. 257, 274 (1959).
"42 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
1" Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760 (Tree Fruits Labor Relations Comm.,
Inc.), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961).
1"' Id. at 1177.
"' Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"I Id. at 316 (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77
(1942) (Douglas, J. concurring)); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S.
284 (1957); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
"1 308 F.2d at 316.
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business policies,"4 9 the appeals court felt constitutionally contrained to construe
the statute to avoid infringment of the exercise of potentially "pure speech", absent
"a substantial economic impact on the secondary employer."' 5 0
Given this constitutional concern, Judge Bazelon concluded that the Board's
assumption that the statute completely banned secondary consumer picketing was
an "erroneous premise."'' Rather, such conduct violated subsection 8(b)(4)(ii) only
if it amounted to "threats, coercion... [or] restraint" which, the opinion suggested,
would have been the case only if there had been work stoppages, interrupted
deliveries, violence or threats of violence, coercion of or confrontation with consumers, or the likelihood of "substantial economic injury" to the supermarket. '
It was this holding-that picketing the "struck product" could run afoul of
subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it resulted in substantial economic injury to the retailerwhich led the Supreme Court to reverse the court of appeals.' 3 Justice Brennan,
writing for the five member majority, shared the lower court's concern over the
troubling constitutional questions raised by a broad ban on picketing. He elected
to avoid this problem, however, not by requiring proof of actual economic injury
to the secondary, but by implicitly assuming that no such harm existed. He reasoned
that there was no violation of the statute, "merely because respondents' picketing
even if this
was effective to reduce Safeway's sales of Washington State apples,
5 4
led or might lead Safeway to drop the item as a poor seller.'
The effort to interpret subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in a way that permitted this
product picketing prompted Justice Brennan to engage in one of the most myopic
examinations of legislative history in the annals of Supreme Court history.'
Declaring that the Court would not "ascrib[e] to Congress a purpose to outlaw
peaceful picketing unless 'there is the clearest indication in the legislative history'
... that Congress intended to do so as regards the particular ends of the picketing
under review,' 5' 6 the majority opinion steadfastly ignored statements, by congressional supporters and opponents alike, which demonstrated that, while consumer

1"9 Id.
1,o

Id. at 317.
at 318.

'Id.

d. at 317-18. This willingness to find a congressional intent to ban publicity picketing when
it caused substantial economic injury to the secondary retailer but not otherwise anticipated the rationale
found in the Supreme Court's retreat from Tree Fruits in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,
Local 1001, (Safeco) 447 U.S. 607 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 217-24.
"
NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
2

"'

Id.

at 72-73.

The extent to which Justice Brennan has been willing to engage in creative statutory construction
to avoid addressing first amendment issues is legendary. For a particularly enlightening and intimate
treatment of how this was accomplished in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961) (mandatory union dues used for political purposes alleged to violate the first amendment), see
B. ScHWARTz, SUPaRcHiEF: EARL WARREN AND His SuPREmE COURT-A JUDICIAL BiooRAPHY 371-76
(1983).
"' 377 U.S. at 63 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 284).
'"
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picketing generally was intended to be banned, no one in Congress ever made the
distinction sought by Justice Brennan-between picketing directed solely at the struck
product and that seeking a total consumer boycott of the secondary's business.' 5 7
Nonetheless, the former category of picketing was held not to be one of the "isolated
evils" intended to be outlawed by Congress and therefore it did not "threaten,
coerce or restrain" Safeway within the meaning of subsection 8(b)(4)(ii).' 58 Unlike
a total consumer boycott, which would have "coerced" the supermarket by "inflict[ing] injury on his business generally"' 59 and thereby have created a "separate
dispute," 60 "struck product" picketing was deemed to injure the primary employer
only, leaving the secondary free to replace the offending product with other goods,
should it become a "poor seller."' 6' This picketing was thus determined to have
no more serious impact upon the secondary retailer than would successful primary
activity. In fact, although the opinion stopped short of characterizing this picketing
as "primary," it took pains to stress that "the union's appeal is closely confined
62
to the primary dispute."'1
The majority opinion in Tree Fruitsseized upon the specific facts of the casepicketing a limited number of products among the hundreds sold in the
supermarket-to categorize "struck product" picketing as being "poles apart" from
"consumer picketing to shut off all trade with the secondary employer.' ' 63
Justice Harlan, speaking for the dissent, was not at all convinced that such
a dichotomy existed:
The distinction drawn by the majority becomes even more tenuous if a picketed
retailer depends largely or entirely on sales of the struck product. If, for example,
an independent gas station owner sells gasoline purchased from a struck gasoline
company, one would not suppose he would feel less threatened, coerced or restrained
by picket signs which said "Do not buy X gasoline" than by signs which said "Do
not patronize this gas station." To be sure Safeway is a multiple article seller, but
it cannot well be gainsaid that the rule laid down by the Court would be unworkable
if its applicability turned on a calculation of the relation between total income of
the secondary employer and income from the struck product. 61
Justice Harlan's concerns were to prove prophetic.
'7

See id. at 80-94 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
377 U.S. at 71.
I Id. at 72.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163
16,

Id. at 70.
Id. at 83. The dissenters (Harlan, J. and Stewart, J.) would have enforced the NLRB's order,

after reaching the first amendment issue and finding no constitutional violation in Congress' "attempts
to effect an accommodation between the right of unions to publicize their position and the social desirability
of limiting a form of communication likely to have effects caused by something apart from the message
communicated ... ." Id. at 93.
Justice Black concurred in the result, but rejected the majority's strained analysis. Justice Black
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The Seed Falls on Mostly Barren Ground-the Response to Tree Fruits

Unions eagerly reembraced their old friend, the picket line, often using it in
a context vastly different than the Safeway apple boycott. They were to learn,
however, that their victory in Tree Fruits was severely limited. In fact, from the
date of that decision to the present, with only a couple of fairly recent exceptions
under the "Carter Board,"' 65 the NLRB has proven itself remarkably unwilling
to permit the use of product picketing in other circumstances. Instead, the Board
has found almost all the cases of consumer picketing which have come before it
since 1964 to be unlawful, 66 invoking one of three doctrines developed to get around
Tree Fruits: "merged products;" misidentification of the struck product or the
primary-secondary employer relationship; and, the single product employer-Justice

Harlan's hypothetical, which the Court ruled on in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
67
Union Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.).
1. Merged Products

The Tree Fruits rationale works in a straightforward manner only if the picketed
product sold to the public by the secondary employer-retailer is identifiable as the
discrete product which left the primary employer. Should the latter provide a service,
such as cleaning or building construction, which cannot be directly resold, or should
its product be incorporated only as a part of the ultimate product which reaches
the public, then it is not possible to limit the desired response to the struck product
agreed with the dissenters that Congress had intended to proscribe the picketing in this case, and that
the first amendment constitutional issue had to be reached. Unlike the dissent, however, Justice Black
found a first amendment violation: the picketing was not banned because the picketers were asking
others to do something unlawful (indeed, similar requests using nonpicketing forms of publicity are
protected by the statute), nor was the picketing banned in the interest of public order; rather, under
the proviso, the picketing was banned because of the substance of the picketers' particular views. Id.
at 76-80. "The result is an abridgment of the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public
their side of a labor controversy, a subject . . . protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 79.
The constitutional aspect of secondary consumer boycott regulation has been the subject of numerous
valuable articles. See, e.g., Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951);
Mack and Lieberwitz, Secondary Consumer Picketing: The First Amendment Questions Remain, 32
MERCER L. RaV. 814 (1981); St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The PersistingProblem
of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 883 (1982); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free
Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L. J. 938 (1982).
"I5United Paperworks Local 832 (Duro Paper Bag Mfg. Co.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1978), vacated
sub nom. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980); Local 399, United Bhd. of Carpenters
and Joiners of America (K & K Constr. Co.), 233 N.L.R.B. 718 (1977), vacated sub nom. K & K
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228 (3d Cir. 1979).
,"' This is of course, far from saying that all attempts at Tree Fruitspicketing have failed. Under
§ 3(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976), the NLRB's General Counsel has the discretion to
decide whether or not to file a complaint alleging that product picketing violated § 8(b)(ii)(B). Cases
closely conforming to the Tree Fruits fact pattern would thus have been unlikely to reach the Board.
One which did, shortly after the Tree Fruits decision was issued, was summarily decided in favor of
the union. Brewery Workers Union No. 8 (Bert P. Williams, Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. 728 (1964).
" NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
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alone. Unavoidably, there must also be a boycott of other products or the entire

secondary business. The policy question, in light of Tree Fruits, therefore, is which
party must suffer because of this inability to isolate the primary's product.', 8
Although such cases began to reach the NLRB shortly after Tree Fruits, the

Board took several years to articulate its position. 69 It did so initially in Honolulu
Typographical Union, No. 37 (Hawaii Press Newspapers, Inc.),' 70 wherein the

disputing union picketed a shopping center in which some of the tenants, mostly
restaurants, had advertised in the primary's newspaper. The Board had previously

held,' 7 ' with judicial approval,' 72 that advertising services became part of the product
which was advertised, within the meaning of subsection 8(b)(4) and the publicity

proviso. Thus retailers who advertised specific wares could find themselves the

legitimate targets of consumer boycotts, including picketing directed at the struck
(advertised) product. 73 Therefore, because the restaurants in Honolulu
Typographical Union had advertised their businesses as a whole in the struck
newspaper, the union apparently believed, as did dissenting Board Member Jenkins,
that picketing requesting the public not to patronize them at all was permissible. 171
See generally Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp, 19
KAN. L. REv. 651, 701-02 (1971); Note, § 8(b)(4): Merged Products and the Search for Standards,
13 J. MAR. L. Rv.421 (1980).
269 In Local 254, Building Service Employees (University Cleaning Co.), 151 N.L.R.B. 341 (1965),
enforced, 359 F.2d 290 (Ist Cir. 1966), the Board adopted, without comment, the Trial Examiner's
finding that picketing at the consumer entrances of secondary employers who used the primary's cleaning
services violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report, written before the Supreme
Court's opinion in Tree Fruits, had distinguished the Circuit Court's decision therein by pointing out
that "neither [secondary employer] was purveying to its customers-who might have been inclined to
respect a product boycott picket line-any goods or services furnished by the primary employer." 151
N.L.R.B. at 347. The same result was reached without elaboration, on similar facts, in Building Service
Employees Local 105 (Charles R. Johnson), 151 N.L.R.B. 1424 (1965), enforced, 367 F.2d 227 (10th
Cir. 1966). Cf. Laundry, Dry Cleaning & Dye House Workers, Local 259 (Morrison's of San Diego,
Inc.), 164 N.L.R.B. 426 (1967). During this period (1965-1967), the Board also upheld violations when
construction unions having primary disputes with non-union contractors placed consumer pickets at
the housing developments or commercial facilities built by the contractor. See Salem Bldg. Trades Council
(Cascade Employers Ass'n., Inc.), 163 N.L.R.B. 33 (1967), enforced, 388 F.2d 987 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 965 (1968); Alton-Wood River Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Alton District
Indep. Contractors), 154 N.L.R.B. 982 (1963); Millmen & Cabinet Makers Union, Local 550 (Steiner
Lumber Co.), 153 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1965), enforced, 367 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1966).
"° 167 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1967), enforced, 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
' See supra text accompanying notes 120-24 for a discussion of the Middle South case.
37 Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1966), enforcing
150 N.L.R.B. 467 (1964).
" Cf. Atlanta Typographical Union No. 48 (Times-Journal, Inc.), 180 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1970).
"T Member Jenkins felt that the Tree Fruits result directly controlled the case:
The rationale of [Tree Fruits] is that the picketing can be directed at the struck product
and nothing more, but it hardly follows from this, as my colleagues apparently conclude
it does, that if all the products or services of an establishment are advertised in struck newspapers
the picketing of all somehow becomes unlawful. The decision that the struck product-the
items advertised in the struck papers-may be picketed requires the opposite conclusion. Since
the Union here attempted to reach no more than these products, they did not spread their
36
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The majority did not agree. It chose instead to interpret Tree Fruits to mean that,
if product picketing had a different impact on the secondary employer than would
successful primary action, the "limited privilege" to picket did not exist." In other
words, in Tree Fruits either a successful strike at the primary employer's apple
packing plants or the picketing of Safeway's stores would have created the same
result. Safeway would have been unable to sell the primary's apples, but there would
have been no effect on the rest of its business. Here, however, a successful strike
at the newspaper would have -had no appreciable effect on customers who would
otherwise have chosen to eat at the restaurants, whereas honoring the picketers'
request led to "injury ... inflicted on their business generally." 76 This presented
the other, unlawfully coercive, side of the dichotomy set out by Justice Brennan
in Tree Fruits.
On appeal,'" the D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Tree Fruits result, as
all federal appellate courts subsequently faced with merged product cases have
done.' The decision reached an assessment of the underlying policy tensions:
Here, where picketing means a total boycott, one interest must plainly yield, either
the Union's desire to maximize pressure on the primary employer (the newspaper)
by cutting off its markets or the neutral's desire to avoid a boycott of his entire
business. In the 1959 amendments, Congress chose protection of the neutral from
this sort of disruption as the interest more deserving of protection. Indeed, the
Supreme Court so stated in Tree Fruitswhen it characterized as one of the "isolated
evils" barred by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), "picketing which persuades the customers of a
secondary employer to stop all trading with him."' 19
The Board soon considered another restaurant case, Teamsters Local 323
(American Bread Co.), 8 in which the union was able to identify a discrete
product-bread-that the customers were asked to avoid, unlike the generalized
appeal in Honolulu Typographical Union. Despite this distinction, the Board found
the union's objective to be a total boycott, reasoning that, since the restaurant's
dispute beyond the permissible bounds, even though in those cases where all the establishment's products were advertised, the tendency of the picketing was to cause a cessation of
all patronage.
167 N.L.R.B. at 1034.
"1 167 N.L.R.B. at 1031.
176 Id. at 1032.
'"

401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

See also Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980); K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
592 F.2d 1228 (3d Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972);
American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1967). Cf. NLRB v. Building Service Employees
Local 105, 367 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1966).
The D.C. Circuit later reached a different conclusion in "single-product secondary" cases, despite
the fact that the net effect was the same-an unavoidable boycott of virtually the entire business. See
infra notes 203-24 and accompanying text.
179401 F.2d at 956 (quoting 377 U.S. at 71).
110170 N.L.R.B. 91 (1968), enforced, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
"'
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customers could not choose among breads as they could in a supermarket, their
choice as a practical matter was between taking the meals as offered or going
elsewhere.' 81 As the Board saw it, "the bread
loses its identity when served,82
and becomes a part of the restaurant's product which is offered to its customers."'
The "merged product" doctrine did not require that the struck product be
literally incapable of separation from other items sold by the secondary employer,
only that it be inconvenient, so that the likely response of customers wishing to
honor the picket line would be to go somewhere else. This lesson was brought home
to the NLRB recently by the Sixth Circuit when the Board approved picketing to
encourage grocery store shoppers not to use the primary's paper bags to bag their
groceries, but instead to bring their own bags or ask the store for boxes.' 83 The
Board had held that even though the bags might be considered a "service" by the
store, as opposed to one of its products, there had been no "loss of product identity,"
and the shoppers "could purchase all the products they desired without necessarily
using paper bags to carry the groceries.""'8 On review, the Sixth Circuit disagreed,
rejecting the Board's attempt to distinguish this case from American Bread: "In
American Bread, it was physically possible for consumers to bring their own bread
or go without, just as it was possible for Kroger shoppers to bring their own bags
or go without. However, in both cases it was unrealistic to expect them to do so." ''8 5
The court also concluded that "the picketing could have had no other object but
a boycott of Kroger."' 8 The Board's decision was held unsupported by substantial
evidence, despite undisputed proof that the union had clearly directed its appeal
toward the bags alone, that some shoppers had in fact brought their own bags,
and that Kroger had either boxes or plastic bags (normally carried as part of its
stock) to substitute for the subject paper bags. 187 In short, because inconvenience
to shoppers was likely to discourage some from trading with Kroger, the paper
bag manufacturer's employees were barred from maintaining any pickets
whatsoever.' 88
III

170 N.L.R.B. at 93.

Id. This, of course, was not entirely accurate with regard to most of the ways in which bread
would be served in a restaurant. For a somewhat facetious example, it is certainly possible to separate
a chicken salad sandwich order, leaving the chicken salad and disposing of the bread, as Jack Nicholson
so eloquently explained to his waitress in the film Five Easy Pieces-aprocess which, in her case, would
have left the bread stuck between her legs. Or a meal can be provided without bread (or, at least in
Nashville where this case arose, with cornbread, something almost invariably made on the premises).
"I United Paperworkers Local 832 (Duro Paper Bag Mfg. Co.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1978), vacated
sub nom. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980).
"'

236 N.L.R.B. at 1527.

116

Id.

"'

See 236 N.L.R.B. at 1526-28.

634 F.2d at 638.

Persons having spent time in the United Kingdom, as well as other foreign countries, would
likely find the conclusion that free paper bags are indispensible to grocery shoppers more than a little
ethnocentric. There the norm is for shoppers either to bring their own bags, use boxes supplied by
the store, or purchase bags (usually plastic) at the checkout counter.
"'

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 7
1154

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

2. Misidentification
The requirement in the publicity proviso that all protected nonpicketing communication must be truthful' 89 has been construed liberally by the NLRB, 9 0 which
requires only that there be "no evidence of intent to deceive" and no "substantial
departure from fact."'' Thus, for example, handbilling which did not specifically
identify the items "produced" by the primary employer did not lose its protection
simply because the reader might incorrectly interpret it to mean that all items in
the store came from that source.' 9
Such liberality was never accorded to the message conveyed by product picketing,
however. It is understandable that a more demanding approach would be taken
here, where calls for total boycotts were impermissible coercion. Yet the NLRB
and the courts have enforced such a high standard in these cases that picketers
are required to be insurers that the public will correctly perceive the limitations
of their appeal or the relationship of the primary to the secondary employer. Instances
where it was impossible to do so have been as much subject to sanction as those
in which it appeared the union appeal had been deliberately or negligently broadened
to encompass a general boycott.
As it did with the merged product doctrine, the NLRB first fully articulated
its test for impermissible misidentification in connection with products advertised
in a newspaper involved in a labor dispute. In Atlanta Typographical Union No.
48 (Times-Journal,Inc.),' 93 the picketers' sandwich board signs had asked the public
not to buy "products advertised by this store" in the target newspaper.' 94 The names
of the specific items, which numbered in the hundreds and were changed frequently
in the advertisements, were not listed on the signs, but copies of the advertisements
themselves were shown to customers who inquired.'"1 Nonetheless the Board held
"' In the words of the statute, it must be "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public...
that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
"9
International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
,' Id. at 806.
192

Id.

180 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1970). Two earlier cases which had come before the Board had turned
on the fact that the primary's product was not clearly identified as the focus of the union's picketing:
Twin City Carpenter's Dist. Council (Red Wing Wood Products, Inc.), 167 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1967), enforced, 422 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1970); Bedding, Curtain & Drapery Workers Union, Local 140 (U.S.
Mattress Corp.), 164 N.L.R.B. 271 (1967), enforced, 390 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
905 (1968). In Redwing, the union had accurately identified the primary's cabinets, which were being
installed in homes sold by the secondary, as the offending product, but had failed to explain the nature
of the primary and secondary employer's relationship, or the labor dispute, to the public. 167 N.L.R.B.
at 1026. In U.S. Mattress, a union dispute centering on bedding was inaccurately broadened into a
request not to purchase not only bedding, but furniture and upholstery as well, 164 N.L.R.B. at 273-74;
moreover, the union's request that the public "look for the union label" was deemed deceptive because
not even manufacturers of products acceptable to the union used such labels. Id.
"1 180 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
"1

195

Id.
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this to be unprotected by Tree Fruitsbecause, when the union broadened its appeal
beyond asking consumers not to purchase the paper and sought a boycott of products
advertised therein, "it assumed the added burden of pursuing such a course in a
manner to insure that its actions would not affect the secondary employer's business
beyond the sale of the product advertised." ' 9 Nor did the union's attempt to supply
the necessary information by making the newspaper ads themselves available meet
this burden. The Board held that subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited all such picketing
"unless the picket signs themselves adequately inform potential customers of the
action they are asked to take." 19 The rationale of Atlanta Typographical Union
was subsequently used by the Board to find violations in similar advertising cases,
even though in one of them'98 identification of the individual products was found
to be "nigh impossible."' 99 This was in part because the advertisement referred
both to named items and to other unnamed ones "in all 100 departments, 2 0 and
in the other a copy of the advertisement had been attached to the picket placards.20 '
The effect on consumers of a picketing union's failure to clearly identify the
discrete products of the primary employer is much like the effect of merging those
products with others sold by the secondary. In both instances the members of the
public who wish to honor the picketers' request are likely to do so by either
withholding all patronage, or by boycotting other items not tainted by association
with the primary employer. This places more economic pressure on the secondary
than it would have experienced had there been successful primary action and
therefore creates a "separate dispute" with the secondary within the meaning of
Tree Fruits, as interpreted by the NLRB and the courts of appeals. 02 The responses
in both instances accordingly have been the same: regardless of whether it is impossible, impractical, or merely inconvenient for the consumer to isolate the struck
product, the union invariably has been found to have used an unlawful means of
seeking a product boycott.
3. The Single Product Secondary Employer-Safeco Substitutes Harm
to the Secondary as the Primary Criterion
A distinct, well-identified product capable of being purchased separately can
be picketed without fear of broadening the appeal beyond the product itself to
"I' Id. at 1016.
'9, Id. See also Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers (Milwaukee Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n.),
230 N.L.R.B. 189 (1977); Independent Routemen's Ass'n. (Urban Distrib., Inc.), 206 N.L.R.B. 245 (1973).
'g' Los Angeles Typographical Union No. 174 (White Front Stores, Inc.), 181 N.L.R.B. 384 (1970).
Id. at 388.

200 Id.
20, San

Francisco Typographical Union No. 21 (San Rafael Indep. Journal), 188 N.L.R.B. 673
(1971), enforced, 465 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1972). The sincerity of the union's effort to restrict its message
was suspect here, however. The copies of the advertisements were often folded and hard to read, and
the simultaneous handbills, as well as the oral comments of picketers, urged shoppers to boycott the
stores completely. 188 N.L.R.B. at 678.
201 See Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB (Monarch Long Beach Corp.), 657 F.2d
1252, 1264-65 (D.C. Cir. 1980), enforcing 243 N.L.R.B. 801 (1979).
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other aspects of the secondary business. Nonetheless, if its sale constitutes the bulk
of the secondary's income the ultimate impact, insofar as that business is concerned,
is the same as the most extreme merged product or misidentified product picketing-a
total boycott. It was in such cases, where the manner of picketing authorized by
Tree Fruits had been scrupulously adhered to, that the NLRB was most pressed
to justify.reaching a different result. It did so, however, by shifting the focus entirely
away from whether the union had been able to restrict its appeal to the struck
product, and emphasizing only the adverse economic impact suffered by the secondary employer, despite such a limitation.
The NLRB first addressed this issue2' in Steelworkers, Local 14055 (Dow
Chemical)," ' the case that Justice Harlan had warned was coming in his Tree Fruits
dissent.2"5 The union there had picketed six service stations, asking consumers not
to purchase Bay gasoline, the product from which all of the stattions received most
of their revenue. Brushing aside the argument that the economic interdependency
between the stations and the primary employer (Dow's Bay Refining Division) made
the former "allies" in the labor dispute, 20 6 thus rendering the picketing primary
activity,2 17 the three-member majority came to grips with Tree Fruits. It reasoned
that the Supreme Court had not found subsection 8(b)(4)(ii) coercion in that case
largely because of "the minimal impact the picketing there would have had, if successful, upon the total business of the secondary retailer, ' 200 whereas in this case,
as in American Bread, "the picketing was reasonably calculated to induce customers
not to patronize the neutral parties ... at all." ' 20 ' Because the Bay service stations
"would predictably be squeezed to a position of duress, escapable only by abandoning Dow in favor of a new source of supply," ' the coercion lacking in Tree
Fruits was deemed present here.
203 Picketing of a one-product secondary-employer had come to the Board before, but it was erroneously classified as an instance of merged product picketing. Cement Masons Union Local 337 (California
Ass'n of Employers), 190 N.L.R.B. 261, modified, 192 N.L.R.B. 377 (1971), enforced sub nom. Hoffman
v. Cement Masons Local 377, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
204 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974),
enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated, 429
U.S. 807 (1976).
203

See supra text accompanying note 164.

20,Three

of the stations were owned by one of Bay's distributors, who leased the stations' property

from Dow, began business with a loan on which Dow as the co-signer had the power to control the
use of the money, paid Dow a percentage of sales as rent, stored his gasoline in tanks owned and
maintained by Dow, and ran the stations using Dow's equipment. The other stations, while not having
such a close interrelationship with Dow, nonetheless operated under similar lease arrangements. 211

N.L.R.B. at 649-51.
20, Relying on established doctrine, the Board rejected the "ally doctrine" because of the absence
of either "common ownership or managerial control." Id. at 651. For an argument that such cases
should be analyzed in terms of the employers' neutrality, see Comment, ConsumerPicketing:Reassessing
the Concept of Employer Neutrality, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 172 (1977).
o1211 N.L.R.B. at 651.
209 Id.
210

Id.
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Without saying so, the Board had thus returned to Judge Bazelon's rationale

in Tree Fruits,2 1'-that unlawful coercion existed whenever the product picketing
had a substantial economic effect on the secondary'employer212-despite the fact

that this had been the very reason the court of appeals had been reversed by the
214
Supreme Court.2 13 This fact was not lost on the two dissenting Board members

nor on the D.C. Circuit, which distinguished merged product cases and its Honolulu
Typographical Union decision and refused to enforce the NLRB's order.2"
Dow Chemical was vacated by the Supreme Court,'

6

which then granted cer-

tiorari on the next single product secondary consumer picketing case decided by
the NLRB-Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.).2 7'

Safeco presented essentially the same facts as Dow Chemical: a union representing
a title insurance company's employees picketed five land title companies which earned

ninety to ninety-five percent of their income from selling the primary's insurance.
Customers were urged to cancel their policies. 2 ' Both the NLRB and the D.C.

Circuit reaffirmed their earlier holdings in Dow Chemical, the Board again finding
a subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation, and the court, sitting en banc and dividing
five to four, denying enforcement.
The stage was set for a determination of whether the legality of such picketing
was henceforth to be judged by the success of its restriction to the struck product,

as the court of appeals would have it, or by the economic impact yardstick now
favored by the NLRB. The Supreme Court not only emphatically endorsed the

NLRB's approach, but went a considerable distance further, in a majority ' 9 opinion
211 Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.
1962), vacated, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).

212 308 F.2d at 317-18.
213 377 U.S. at 72-73.
214 211
2"1524

N.L.R.B. at 652.
F.2d at 857. The panel, which included Judge Bazelon, concluded that in Tree Fruitsthe
Supreme Court "did not consider that the lawfulness of the exercise of the right depended upon differences in the degree of the possible economic impact upon the secondary." Id. at 860.
226 429 U.S. 807 (1976). The case was remanded to the NLRB to determine if intervening
circumstances-the alleged dissolution of the local union-had rendered it moot. Id. The complaint
was subsequently dismissed. 229 N.L.R.B. at 1162-63.
"' 226 N.L.R.B. 754 (1976), enforcement denied, 627 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd,
447 U.S. 607 (1980).
21 226 N.L.R.B. at 755. Again, as in Dow Chemical, the ally doctrine surfaced as an issue. Safeco
owned between 12 and 53 percent of each title company, had at least one of its officers serving as
an officer and board member of the title company and issued all policies under the joint signature
of Safeco's president and a title company officer. Id. Nevertheless, both the NLRB and the court of
appeals found the title companies to be neutral employers and the ally doctrine to be inapplicable.
Id. at 756, 627 F.2d at 1144. This issue was not argued before the Supreme Court. 447 U.S. at 611 n.5.
29 The sixteen years between Tree Fruits and Safeco had seen many changes in the composition
of the Court. Only one member of the Safeco majority, Justice Stewart, was on the Court when Tree
Fruits was decided. The other five Justices, including the opinion's author, Justice Powell, were all
President Nixon appointees. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented.
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harboring such uncertain implications that it has virtually eliminated the use of
product picketing.
The Court sharply limited the significance of Tree Fruits as precedent,
characterizing it as being on the extreme end of the "spectrum of conduct" likely
to be encountered in this area. " ' Echoing the NLRB's interpretation, Tree Fruits
was deemed to have turned on the insignificant part the picketed product played
in the secondary's business-"but one item among the many that made up the
retailer's trade"-and on the conclusion that the injury to the store would have
been so "marginal," as to give it little reason to become involved in the labor
dispute. 2 ' The Safeco boycott, on the other hand, was described as being at the
other extreme of that spectrum, with sympathetic customers having "no realistic
option other than to boycott the title companies altogether,""22 leaving those
businesses with a choice between economic survival and cutting the ties with Safeco.
A company put in such a position, the majority believed, was being coerced within
the meaning of subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
Liability in these cases was henceforth to exist if there was a reasonable
likelihood that the product picketing would "threaten the neutral party with ruin
or substantial loss. 223' The ramifications of this new standard extend far beyond
the Safeco setting. The holding certainly seems to have implicitly approved the earlier
decisions in the merged product and misidentification cases.2 2 4 Moreover, it has
extended the ban to include even pure Tree Fruits picketing of secondary employers
whose income does not come primarily from one struck product. The Court gave
few hints as to how deeply successful picketing could cut into sales before the loss
of revenue would be "substantial," but that point clearly lies somewhere short
of forcing the company out of business. Indeed, all but the most successful businesses
could argue convincingly that any appreciable reduction in profit margin was a
"substantial loss." Under such a test, the weaker the financial position of the secondary employer, the more likely that the picketing would be found illegal, notwithstanding the fact that the target product could have been far from the dominant
item sold by the business.
Perhaps unions are not now chargeable with accurate knowledge of what the
secondary company's financial condition is, but they apparently are at least required
to anticipate whether picketing would cause it to fear for its economic well-being,
so that this fear, and not the nuisance of dumping a "poor seller," would influence
the secondary company's decision-making. Such a judgment is exceedingly difficult
220

447 U.S. at 615 n.11.

"I

Id. at 613.

222

Id.

Id. at 615 n.1 1. The Court established this test to govern struck product picketing in the future,
warning that neither the results in Tree Fruits nor those in Safeco, would necessarily control. Id.
224 See Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980), vacating 236 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1978),
in which the court of appeals applied the Safeco test to strike down what it characterized as merged
product picketing.
"I

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss4/7

32

Bush: Customers, Coercion and Congressional Intent: Regulating Secondar
1159

SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

1984]

for outsiders to make with any assurance. As a result, virtually no product picketing,
other than the type encompassed within the narrow facts of Tree Fruitsitself, could
now be safely said in advance to be lawful. Doubtlessly reflecting this uncertainty,
no labor organization has been willing to risk an NLRB decision on this issue in
the more than three years since Safeco was decided.

V. TI

PUBLICITY PRoviso-NEW LirfTs ON

AN

OLD RIGHT

After the Servette decision, with its flat statement that Congress had not intended
the protection of the publicity proviso to be any narrower than the prohibitions
of subsection 8(b)(4),"2 s it seemed that virtually all consumer boycotts solicited by
means other than picketing"2 ' were acceptable, as long as there was no substantial
departure from the facts and no intent to deceive the public about the primarysecondary employer relationship or the nature of the labor dispute.2 ' Recent decisions have retreated from this position, however, establishing boundaries beyond
which the primary-secondary economic relationship was deemed too tenuous to permit a boycott and engrafting a relevance requirement onto the existing truthfulness
standard.
A.

The "Producer-Distributor"Nexus

It has long been settled that within the meaning of the publicity provisio all
employers generate something which could be considered a "product" and its use
or consumption by other employers could subject them to a consumer boycott,
despite the fact that nothing coming from the first employer is ever sold to the
public. 2 8 Viewed in this light, the "producer-distributor" nexus set out in the publicity proviso "a product or products . . . produced by an employer . . . and...
distributed by another employer," seemed to be merely an awkward way of describing any economic relationship beneficial to the secondary employer's business.
Therefore, assuming the public was given a substantially accurate description of
this relationship and of the primary labor dispute, it should matter little what the
exact nature or magnitude of the relationship was, as long as one existed. This
has in fact been the NLRB's approach recently when boycott attempts involved
businesses x'vhich purchased nothing from the primary but received demonstrable
benefits from its activities.
225377

U.S. at 55.

There were
publicity. See, e.g.,
261, modified, 192
468 F.2d 1187 (9th
226

several notable, and unsuccessful, union attempts to convert picketing into "pure"
Cement Masons Union Local 337 (California Ass'n of Employers), 190 N. L.R.B.
N.L.R.B. 377 (1971), enforced sub nom. Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local 337,
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (patrolling with placards reading: "I

am a cement mason union handbiller-Please take my handbill"); Nashville Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council (Castner-Knott Dry Goods Store), 188 N.L.R.B. 470 (1971) (picket signs urging customers only
to "Please Read Handbills Given at Each Entrance").
22, See supra notes 109 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lohman.
S American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, San Francisco Local (Great Western Broadcasting Corp.), 150 N.L.R.B. 467 (1964), enforced, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. deniedJ84

U.S. 1002 (1966).
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The Board's first occasion to construe the producer-distributor nexus outside
the context of either a direct contractual relationship or a product chain came in
United Steelworkers of America (Pet,Inc.). 229 A national boycott of the products
and services of Pet and many of its subsidiary companies was mounted by the
Steelworkers, who represented only the employees at one of the subsidiaries, the
A. Hussman Refrigerator Company. Hussman manufactured commercial refrigeration equipment, display cases and other commercial and industrial equipment, but
nothing which was sold to the general public. Pet, Hussman's parent company,
was a diversified, billion-dollar conglomerate, which also owned numerous other
companies producing various retail food products, as well as a restaurant chain.
Having no product of Hussman's which consumers could be asked to shun, the
union might have urged a boycott of all retail stores using Hussman equipment.
Such a move would foreseeably have put little feed-back pressure on Hussman,
however, because the retailers would be difficult to identify and, even if boycotted,
very few of them would have had any further business dealings with Hussman,
having already purchased its equipment. It would have made no sense to pressure
companies that were not in a position to threaten the primary with loss of business.
The union elected instead to boycott the retail products of the parent corporation
and its other subsidiaries, presumably a much more effective tactic given the fact
that their profits and losses all contributed to Pet's viability, and that Hussman's
labor relations were, in the final analysis, subject to Pet's direction. Pet charged,
however, and the NLRB General Counsel agreed, that such a boycott was a form
of coercion not encompassed by the publicity proviso, because Hussman was not
a "producer" of Pet's "products" or those of its subsidiaries. 230
The Board rejected this contention, drawing on Lohman and Middle South
Broadcasting Corp. for the proposition that a total secondary boycott could be
urged here, as long as Hussman had "at some stage produced, in the sense of
applying capital, enterprise or service, a product of the neutral employer." '2 ' 1 It
found such production in Hussman's contribution of its profits, goodwill and the
element of diversification to Pet and, derivatively, to the other subsidiaries. Thus,
the economic well-being that Hussman supplied was seen by the Board as playing
a significant enough role in the ability of the other companies to produce their
232
products to satisfy the producer-distributor nexus.
The NLRB adhered to this rationale in Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades
Council (The Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.).233 As in Pet, the labor organization
in DeBartolo needed an effective way to use public pressue in its dispute with a
229 244
230 244
23,1 Id.

N.L.R.B. 96 (1979), enforcement denied, 641 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1981).
N.L.R.B. at 99.
at 101.

232 On

appeal, the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement, castigating the NLRB's willingness to equate
Hussman's contributions to the production of products. The court believed the proviso was unavailable
because Hussman did not literally "work on" actual products of the other companies. 641 F.2d at 549.
233 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
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primary employer which sold nothing directly to the public. In this case, the primary
employer was a nonunion construction company (High) which was building a department store for a major tenant in DeBartolo's shopping mall. The unions could
have limited their boycott to the business of the tenant in question (Wilson's) by
asking customers not to shop at its other branches."' Such a boycott at the shopping
mall itself would have been completely ineffective, though, for the simple reason
that the store, being still under construction, would have had no customers.
The unions took another tack. Apparently believing, rightly or wrongly, that
the shopping mall owner, DeBartolo, could persuade Wilson's to cease doing business
with High, union members handbilled at the mall. They asked customers not to
shop at any of the stores, or at least to express their concern to the store managers
therein, until DeBartolo "publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will
2 35
be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits.
The appeal, of course, was for a total boycott of all the other tenants, since DeBartolo itself owned the shopping center but did not run the shops or directly sell
products to the public. In the unions' view, references to the stores of the other
tenants was no different than asking generally for a boycott of the mall, because
the public perceived the mall and its stores as one and the same enterprise.236
The NLRB found such a boycott to be protected, even though there was no
direct contractual relationship between High and DeBartolo or any of the other
tenants. The requisite "producer-distributor" relationship was present, in the Board's
judgment, because of the economic realities underlying the cooperative nature of
shopping center ventures-realities reflected in DeBartolo's standard lease agreement which "evidence[d] the collective dependence of the mall owner and its
tenants," whereby "the success of each tenant contributes to, and depends upon,
the success of the others. ' 2 37 In other words, High's construction of Wilson's store
2S, Such a boycott had been given Board approval in Local Union No. 54, Sheet Metal Workers

(Sakowitz, Inc.), 174 N.L.R.B. 362 (1969).
235 252 N.L.R.B. at 703.
236 Id. at 704.
37 Id. at 705. As summarized by the NLRB, DeBartolo's standard tenant lease provided that:
Each tenant agrees to pay DeBartolo a set minimum rent. The standard lease further
provides that each tenant's minimum rent will automatically increase 10 percent upon the
date each additional department store of certain size or larger opens for business. And, in
addition to the minimum rent, each tenant agrees to pay DeBartolo a percentage rent based
upon a percentage of the tenant's adjusted gross sales in excess of a set yearly figure.
The standard lease also provides that all tenants shall pay a proportionate share of the
cost of operating, maintaining, and repairing the common areas of the shopping center. A
new tenant in the shopping center will reduce each tenant's proportionate share.
All tenants must join and pay dues to a merchants association, the purpose of which
is inter alia, joint advertising projects. DeBartolo, through the standard lease, exercises control over its tenants' construction work, business hours, employees, signs, and equipfnent.
Each tenant agrees not to use its premises in any way that will injure the reputation of the
shopping center or interfere with the operations of the other tenants.
Id. at 703.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984

35

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 7
1162

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

represented the production of a product from which both Wilson's and the other
tenants would derive some benefit by sales to persons attracted to the mall by that
store. DeBartolo, in turn, benefitted by virtue of the fact that Wilson's rent, like
that of the other tenants, was calculated in part based on a percentage of the store's
adjusted gross sales. 238 Based upon the existence of these mutual obligations and
benefits which the Board characterized as a "symbiotic relationship," High was
held to be a "producer" of products distributed by DeBartolo and all of its tenants,
within the meaning of the publicity proviso.
This result was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, 2 9 which declined to follow
the Eighth Circuit's earlier rejection of the Board's view in Pet.24 ° Faced with this
conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in DeBartolo
to determine whether the requisite producer-distributor
relationship existed. In a
24
unanimous decision, the Court held that it did not. '
Even though the Court, like the parties, was willing to assume that Wilson's
"distributed" High's "product" here, 2 2 it was unwilling to find that DeBartolo
and the other tenants did so, reasoning instead that the NLRB's "symbiotic relationship" test had impermissibly shifted the inquiry from the primary-secondary
relationship to that between the secondaries and "then test[ed] that relationship
by a standard so generous that it will be satisfied by virtually any secondary employer
that a union might want consumers to boycott.' '23 This the Court was not willing
to accept, believing as it did, that the "distribution requirement" reflected congressional intent to exclude at least some "peaceful, truthful handbilling that informs
the public of a primary dispute. ' 2 ' Thus, the Court observed, boycotting DeBartolo
and the cotenants would have come within the publicity proviso only if they had
had a "business relationship with High" or had "[sold] any products whose chain
' 243
of production can reasonably be said to include High.
The Court's unwillingness to construe the publicity proviso so as to permit
a boycott at the mall raised once again the troubling question of the first amendment's relevance to these economic disputes.2" 6 But aside from this, it also insured
that the NLRB and the courts must evaluate every consumer boycott to determine
whether the secondary employer's connection to the primary is direct enough, or

:3S

239
240

See supra note 237.

662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
See supra note 232.

2, 103 S. Ct. 2926.
,' Id. at 2932.
243

Id.

244 Id.

241Id. at 2933.
24 Having concluded

that the publicity proviso was not applicable, the Court remanded the case
to the NLRB to decide two questions not reached in the initial Board decision: whether the handbilling
constituted unlawful coercion under § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). If so, the further question of whether such a statutory
prohibition violated the unions' first amendment rights would then be squarely presented, an issue the
Court felt compelled not to reach. Id.
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strong enough, to bring the union activity within the protection of the statute. It
is difficult to tell, for instance, whether Pet and its subsidiaries could now be picketed
because of their "business relationship" with Hussman, or whether this term envisions something more akin to arms-length contractual dealings, capable of being
severed by the affected secondary employer.
B.

"Relevance" is Added to the Truthfulness Standard

Unions guilty of confusing the public's perception of the primary object of
their labor dispute have regularly been found in violation of the publicity proviso's
"truthfulness" requirement. 2 7 Until recently, however, the NLRB had demanded
only that "the publicity advise the public of the nature of the primary dispute and
'
the secondary employer's relationship to it." 248
It was a standard which could be
met by substantial compliance, so that, for instance, failure to identify the primary
employer by name was not fatal, as long as its relationship to the boycotted business
was made clear.249
In Hospital and Service Employees Union, Local 399 (DeltaAirlines, Inc.),25
the NLRB had the occasion to add a further requirement to the effect that, even
if the above disclosure was made, no other "coercive" information could be conveyed during the boycott which was not specifically "for the purpose of" (to use
the publicity proviso's phrase) truthfully advising the public of the nature of the
primary dispute. The use of other truthful information to encourage consumers
to boycott the secondary employer would remove the protection of the publicity
proviso, if the additional matters were not relevant to that employer's relationship
to the primary employer or its labor dispute.2 5 In Delta that meant that the union's
publicity (handbills and articles in the union newspaper) was unlawfully coercive
because it contained statistics on Delta's safety record, when the labor dispute involved the janitorial contractor employed by Delta at its administrative offices.252
The result is not wholly unsalutory in that case, for the union was arguably attempting to shift the public's attention totally away from the actual labor dispute
by implying the existence of a separate safety dispute with Delta. Yet a requirement that all aspects of boycott publicity must henceforth relate strictly to the
primary dispute has disturbing implications for unions wishing to enlist public support in less misleading ways. For instance, would a reference to the secondary
employer's past business dealings with, and support for, other employers involved
in similar but unrelated disputes now render a union's publicity unlawful? Adding
this new relevance requirement has thus simply placed another stumbling block
of uncertain proportions in the path of those wishing to use the consumer boycott.
" See, e.g., Local 732, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Servair Maintenance, Inc.), 229 N.L.R.B. 392,
402 (1977) (Intermediate Report).
"I Central Indiana Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council (K-Mart Corp.), 257 N.L.R.B. 86 (1981).
14,

Id. at 89.

11 263 N.L.R.B. 996 (1982).
" Id. at 998-99.
"
Id.
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RATIONAL APPROACH

After a quarter of a century's experience regulating consumer boycotts under
subsection 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), it is certainly appropriate to ask how well the system is
working. Does it adequately protect and balance the respective interests of business
and labor? Does it provide affected parties with reasonably clear and reliable
guidelines? In most instances, the answer to both questions is yes, at least as long
as the only two relevant statutory considerations are whether the union's publicity

contained a substantially truthful explanation of the labor dispute and the relationship of the boycotted business to it, and whether, as a result of the boycott, secondary
employees have refused to work.
Insofar as clarity and predictability are concerned, both of these inquiries look
to objective, verifiable criteria, enabling parties and adjudicators alike to determine
with reasonable accuracy whether these requirements are being met. Moreover, both
also relate to matters within the control of the boycotting union."' Thus a campaign
can be organized with advance assurance of its legitimacy and, conversely, the
responsibility for failing to meet these standards can be placed solely at the union's
door. Both requirements conform to the spirit of the Landrum-Griffin compromise
as well. The quid pro quo for labor's retention of the right to seek public support
should certainly be the obligation to deal with that public honestly and to refrain
from using a consumer boycott to mask a signal for organized employee activity
which has long been illegal.
I would submit that these two requirements are the only qnes essential to the
equitable regulation of secondary consumer boycotts. The other existing considerations, the consumer picketing and producer-distributor nexus standards, are largely
irrelevant to maintaining the statutory balance of interests. They have also undeniably
been the source of a great deal of confusion, uncertainty, and therefore, litigation.
Given the questionable premises upon which they rest and the dubious distinctions
they make, it would probably serve the public interest better to eliminate them
altogether as limitations on the right to mount consumer boycotts.
With regard to picketing, it is now apparent that the Tree Fruits experiment
has been a failure. While picketing could be permitted or prohibited altogether,
it has proven impossible to preserve a meaningful sphere for product picketing alone.
In far too many cases, the struck product cannot be satisfactorily isolated and even
when it can the lawfulness of picketing is now conditioned upon a factor (extent
of economic injury) beyond the union's control or perhaps even its knowledge.
Thus this aspect of labor-management relations has all the certainty of Russian
roulette.
"' While the statute is framed in terms of the boycott having "an effect of inducing" a work
stoppage in order to eliminate the element of intent, the boycotting union is not absolutely liable for
isolated work stoppages or interrupted deliveries. Cf., Retail Clerks Union Local 329 (Barker Bros.
Corp.), 138 N.L.R.B. 478 (1962), enforced, 328 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1964) (construing analogous "effect" language under § 8(b)(7)).
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If the assumptions about consumer picketing which prevailed in 1959 were valid,
it would probably be best to abandon Tree Fruits altogether and return to a total
ban on picketing. For several reasons, however, these assumptions now appear to
be largely unwarranted. First, experience has put the lie to the belief, widely held
before 1959, that any picketing would inevitably cause sympathetic union members
to stop work or refuse to make deliveries. Since passage of the Landrum-Griffin
Act, organized workers have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to cross and
work behind a picket line, when informed that it is directed solely toward consumers. Second, it is undoubtedly true that, out of loyalty, many union member
consumers would honor a picket line in support of a total boycott.2"4 But would
such persons react differently if picketers were replaced by handbillers? It does
not seem likely, since the message is exactly the same.
Beyond the belief that picketing exerts a disproportionately strong reaction from
sympathetic members of organized labor lies the fear of its negative impact upon
the vastly larger group of disinterested citizens generally. Violence, physical intimidation, mass picketing, threats and abusive language are always possible, but such
conduct is unlawful in any context and the secondary employer has ample legal
recourse, both civil and criminal, state and federal, to stop it should the occasion
arise. 2" This leaves the unpleasantness of being asked to publicly take sides in a
labor dispute and the "I dare you to cross this line" sort of confrontation that
faces persons who might wish to enter a picketed store. Eliminating this kind of
"coercion" has been a major, if not always explicit, objective in the many cases
since Tree Fruits which have found product picketing to be illegal. Yet, again it
is hard to see enough difference in the level of coercion to justify a policy of treating
25 6
picketing any differently than, say, leafletting.
It is difficult to escape the feeling that opposition to consumer picketing sprang
as much from disapproval of boycotts in general as from any of these assumptions. Boycotts are just not things that nice people do; they must be tolerated,
if at all, only because of first amendment considerations. Indeed, it is obvious from
the legislative history that consumer boycotts would probably have been outlawed
altogether in 1959 were it not for this constitutional inhibition.2 57 Assuming this
assessment is correct, it is a sad commentary on what little appreciation legislators
(and judges) have had for the reasons why boycotts should be permitted, as a positive
I" Justice Stevens, concurring in Safeco, seemed to be concerned with this kind of "signalling"

effect. See 447 U.S. at 619.
255 Cf.,

256The

R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, ch. 10, §§ 5-6; ch. 16, § 7 (1976).
threats, coercion and restraints of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) properly refer to pressures experienced

by secondary employers or their agents, not consumers.'In this sense, picketing probably does result
in greater "coercion" against the boycotted business, in large part because the union's message can
be transmitted to the potential audience more effectively on signs that can be seen from a distance
than by leaflets (which may or may not be accepted or read by shoppers), newspaper advertisements
or other publicity not available at the site. But surely Congress did not intend to distinguish between
forms of public communication solely on the basis of how well they worked!
255 See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
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element in national labor policy. Since workers, even when organized, have no control over any ingredient essential to a successful business operation, save their own
labor, it would seem that the use of such a democratic forum would be encouraged
as a way of permitting public opinion to weigh in the balance in labor disputes.
Certainly the public, acting as individuals, should be entitled to choose whether
to aid the labor organization or to continue to support those who benefit financially
from association with the primary employer. Given a more positive view of the
boycott, there would be little reason why properly controlled picketing could not
be used for exactly the same kinds of public appeals as other forms of publicity.
The Supreme Court's recent constriction of the producer-distributor relationships that can give rise to lawful boycotts also appears to represent an unnecessary
judicial intrusion into labor disputes. First of all, DeBartolo'sassumption that the
publicity proviso implicitly limits the range of permissible secondary boycott targets
is certainly not the only possible reading of the statute. Attempts to give the terms
"product" and "produces" similarly restrictive meanings, and thus insulate certain
categories of primary employers from the effect of consumer boycotts, have long
since foundered on the inconsistency of such constructions with the well-established
understanding that the purpose of the proviso was to protect consumer boycotts
generally."' Given this policy of preserving public appeals as the sole form of
legitimate secondary coercion, an equally persuasive interpretation of the productproducer-distributor passage is that it was merely a way of phrasing the publicity
exemption in terms of one of the major evils to which subsection 8(b)(4)(ii) was
addressed-coercion of stores selling the primary employer's products. 5 9
Even if the Court was correct in its view that Congress wished lines to be drawn
between different categories of secondary employers, however, this cannot be done
in any coherent fashion. DeBartolo's "business relationship/product chain" standard
seems to rest upon an evaluation of one or both of the following factors: Whether
the secondary's economic interests are aligned closely enough with the primary so
that it would be fair to permit it to share the primary's economic suffering; or,
whether the relationship is such that the secondary employer would be able to choose
between ending it unilaterally, by terminating a contract or dropping a product,
or riding out the boycott. Would this standard actually shield employers whose
well-being is more remotely connected to the primary, exposing only those with
the stronger economic ties? If Pet and DeBartolo are themselves any indication,
the answer is clearly no. The parent corporation and fellow subsidiaries of a primary
employer, all of whom are joined in the common pursuit of maximized profits,
have a much greater stake in the primary's economic health than would many of
the completely independent businesses that simply carry its product or use its services. So too the economic benefits 'from a primary employer's construction of.
a store in a shopping mall flow not only to the tenant for whom it is built, but
288 See supra text accompanying note 136.
289 See Kramer, The 8(b)(4) Publicity Proviso and NLRB

v. Servette." A Supreme Court Mandate

Ignored, 16 GA. L. REv. 575, 583 (1982).
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to the complex owner and other tenants as well. The direct benefits from a general
increase in business would presumably be less for the latter businesses than for
the occupant. Yet, in any given case, they are likely to be much greater, in terms
of total revenue, than the income to a hypothetical retailer from the sale of a
primary's product.
The other possible DeBartolo rationale for distinguishing between secondary
employers-the ease of severing business connections-appears at first blush to make
more sense. It would not have been possible for the secondary companies in either
Pet or DeBartolo to end their connection with the primary employer or its "product"
simply by terminating a contract with it (direct bilateral contracts did not form
the basis for the relationships), or by dropping out of a retail product chain. Nevertheless, in practical terms, none of the circumstances these businesses found
themselves in were necessarily any more desperate or less amenable to change than,
say, the plight of a licensed retailer whose business is built around the sale of a
single manufacturer's products. In all of these instances the cost of severing the
perceived connections would doubtlessly greatly exceed the economic damage suffered
in a boycott, yet only the product retailer is clearly vulnerable to union pressure.
Forcing the NLRB and the courts to establish these all-or-nothing categories
will not regulate the extent of economic harm actually suffered by any given secondary employer, nor apportion injury according to the proximity of the primary
and secondary's interests. Neither the Board nor the courts are in a position to
gauge the actual results of any given boycott. Success or failure is determined by
many factors, including the degree of community support for or opposition to the
particular union (or organized labor generally), the availability or absence of alternative products or businesses, and the persuasiveness of the union's appeal, to name
but a few. None of these can be accurately assessed before the fact. Perhaps as
a result,othe Board and the courts make no attempt to do so. Instead their decisions
simply postulate a hypothetically successful boycott,2 60 an exercise bearing no
necessary correlation to the level of harm that would have occurred had the boycott
gone forward.16 ' To be required to assume, as Safeco directs, that "ruin or substantial loss" is reasonably likely to occur simply because picketing is directed at a
single product secondarily, or involves a merged product, is to deny the very real
possibility that the public might not respond to the appeal, leaving the boycotted
business largely unaffected.262
260 See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. at 615 ("Since

successful secondary picketing would put [the secondary employer] to a choice between survival and
the severance of ties with [the primary employer], the picketing plainly violates the statutory ban .... "
(emphasis added)). See also Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634, 639 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he Board
should have restricted its inquiry to the likely result of the Union's appeal if it accomplished its object,
a boycott of the Duro bags.").
261 It must be borne in mind that, under § 10(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160()(1976), the regional
attorney is required to seek an injunction if there is "reasonable cause to believe such charge is true
and that a complaint should issue."
22 See Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634, 639-42 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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Rather than such speculative inquiries, surely a more even-handed policy would
be to entrust the public itself with the power to decide whether, or the extent to
which, the union's boycott request should be honored. Assuming shoppers have
been accurately informed and have not been subjected to coercion beyond the mere
presence of union members seeking their support, there is every reason to suppose
that their response will be governed to an appreciable extent by the degree to which
the primary and secondary's interests are perceived to be congruent, or put another
way, by the extent of the union's effort to tailor its campaign so as to avoid
punishing the innocent.
It makes little sense to institute a boycott without taking these perceptions into
account. Appeals to the public represent a significant commitment of prestige on
a union's part. Because success depends more on the reasonableness of its position
than on its ability to control the behavior of the customers, a union rarely would
risk turning public opinion against it by attacking businesses with no easilyunderstood vested interests in the success of the primary employer.
All that is necessary to effectively regulate consumer boycotts is machinery
to insure that the public is neither misled nor actively coerced. To the extent that
the law has imposed requirements beyond these it is building fences where the cattle
are unlikely to stray.
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